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Abstract 
Process theology, along with its connection to questions of suffering and theodicy, 
presents a perspective that is largely absent within biblical scholarship. Similarly, a lack 
of clear cohesion with the biblical text is an evident critique of process theology. A 
hermeneutic that is directly informed by process-oriented passibilism meets a need that is 
present in both biblical scholarship and process theology, allowing for a deeper 
understanding of biblical depictions of suffering. This thesis aims to incorporate the 
theological conclusions of passibilist process theology into a new hermeneutical strategy 
that will allow for a more comprehensive examination of suffering in the Bible.  
The thesis first synthesizes several scholarly works that explore the problem of suffering 
as it relates to both God and humanity. This synthesis produces a theology of powerful 
suffering that reorients the concept of divine power as ultimate suffering in relationship. 
This conclusion is further grounded within the biblical text, revealing an overarching 
biblical narrative of suffering that spans the canon. 
This theological outlook is then translated into guidelines that form a hermeneutic of 
powerful suffering. The proposed hermeneutic is most centrally concerned with a text’s 
role in the canon, granting privilege of perspective to the sufferer and applying the 
process-oriented passibilist understanding of suffering and power to the text. 
Finally, the hermeneutic is applied to Song of Songs (specifically 3:1-4 and 5:2-7). The 
hermeneutic of powerful suffering is found to be successful in revealing an interpretation 
of scripture that allows for greater ease of application and greater understanding of the 
text within the canon. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Ari Aster’s 2019 film Midsommar follows the journey of Dani, a student who is 
processing the tragic death of her family and the growing apathy of her boyfriend, 
Christian.  The two travel, along with friends, to a remote village in Sweden, hoping that 1
the bright midsummer festival of the village will help them clear their minds. What 
begins as an adventurous dive into a foreign culture swiftly becomes a horrific descent 
into brainwashing and madness, as each of Dani’s friends goes missing in turn. Under the 
influence of hallucinogenic drugs and feeling increasingly distanced from her partner, 
Dani finds solace in the arms of the village’s emotional cult. At the climax of the film, 
Dani watches as Christian is paired with a girl in the village for the final ritual, betraying 
her and officially marking the end of their relationship. As Dani wails, grieving for her 
many losses, the members of the cult surround her and begin screaming in unison. They 
match her breathing and wail with her. Slowly, Dani becomes quiet again. The film ends 
gruesomely, with Dani becoming the cult’s heroic figure and Christian being burned 
alive. Dani is finally accepted, and rejects the apathy of her former partner. 
 Although Midsommar features many classic horror frights, especially at its 
shocking ending, Ari Aster has described the film as a “break-up movie.”  When 2
questioned about the cult’s mimicking of Dani’s cries, Aster notes that the villagers 
“speak a language of empathy.”  Perhaps this is why watching Midsommar is such a 3
 Ari Aster, dir., Midsommar (2019; Santa Monica, CA: Lionsgate, 2019), DVD.1
 Mekado Murphy, “Ari Aster on the Bright and Dark Sides of ‘Midsommar,’” The New York 2
Times, July 3, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/03/movies/midsommar-ari-aster.html. 
 Ibid.3
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bizarre experience. Despite the horrors of the world that surround Dani, there is 
something profound to be uncovered in her connection with the village itself and her 
emergence from grief. It is clear from the onset that Christian is disengaged from Dani’s 
suffering and only interested in his own endeavors. When Dani’s emotions are finally 
validated, the audience breathes in relief. Dani moves on from a relationship with 
someone who cannot empathize with her, being accepted into a community that speaks a 
language of empathy. It is clear that Dani’s isolation from Christian stems from his 
unwillingness to see and understand her suffering. He does not understand and he cannot 
understand. Christian is not a bad person, but he fails to suffer with Dani. He treats her 
suffering like an ailment that needs to be fixed.  
 My own experience of the 2020 zeitgeist affirms that Christian’s failure to 
empathize with his suffering partner is not new or rare. As the COVID-19 pandemic hit 
the United States in the spring, recommendations for safety precautions began to trickle 
down from medical and governmental authorities. In addition to shutting down 
businesses and public gatherings, good practices like wearing facial coverings in public, 
maintaining distance from others, and frequent hand washing have been recommended by 
the CDC.  However, there has been incredible resistance to such safety measures from 4
some Americans. The sentiment behind this resistance was echoed by President Donald 
Trump, as he explained that he would not be wearing a mask because, “Wearing a face 
 “How to Protect Yourself and Others,” last modified September 11, 2020, https://4
www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/prevention.html.
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mask as I greet presidents, prime ministers, dictators, kings, queens - I just don't see it.”  5
It is clear what Trump was implying: wearing a facial covering makes one appear weak.  
 Whether due to an increasing culture of bravado and individualism or the simple 
tendency of Americans to push back against being told what to do, it appears as if this 
aversion to appearing weak will continue to influence political endeavors within the 
United States moving forward. Is this preference for strength over humility what we 
would like to accept? Most importantly for this work in particular, how ought Christians 
respond to this divide in popular thought? Are Christians justified in shedding their 
masks, strengthened by their own confidence and aversion to appearing weak? 
Alternatively, should Christians push against this cultural perception of strength as virtue 
in favor of taking up one’s cross, acting in love for one’s neighbor? 
 Questions of power and suffering are naturally intertwined, especially when one 
attempts to discern how suffering ought to be faced. If the goal is to eliminate suffering, 
what is the best way to achieve that goal? If one attains the political and economic power 
necessary to combat the suffering of a nation of people, but feels no compassion for those 
who suffer, suffering will continue. Far too often, those who wish to eliminate suffering 
most fervently do not seem to be in a position to do so easily. If the acquisition of 
coercive power, the power to command and control, is not the best method for 
eliminating suffering, what is? Because coercive power alone cannot alleviate needless 
suffering, it surely cannot be considered the highest order of power. What, then, is 
ultimate power, and how does it work to lessen the burden of suffering?  
 “Coronavirus: Donald Trump wears face mask for the first time,” BBC, July 12, 2020, 5
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53378439.
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 The primary focus of this thesis will be to explore how the biblical text engages 
with and responds to the problem of suffering and the power to alleviate it, as well as the 
implications of such engagement for interpreting the portions of the Bible that either do 
not appear to engage with the problem of suffering directly or challenge other texts 
regarding suffering. The central assertion of this work may be stated as follows: A 
hermeneutic that is formed on the principles of process-oriented passibilism reveals the 
overarching biblical narrative beginning with the imago dei and ending with hope in the 
eschaton, allowing for consistent interpretation of other conflicting texts. 
 Before the thesis itself is examined, I should note the hierarchy of authority 
sources that I am working from. The processes of biblical interpretation and theological 
reflection are inter-mingled and necessarily circular. The best interpretive endeavors are 
informed by theological claims, and vice versa. This thesis begins with a basic conclusion 
from experience: I suffer. As Jürgen Moltmann notes, “It is in suffering that the whole 
human question of God arises.”  From the human experience of suffering, theological 6
questions arise. Moving from experience to observation of creation, claims from natural 
theology will be prioritized next. These claims will then be tested against the biblical text. 
If they are found to be affirmed within the biblical text, they can then be utilized within a 
hermeneutic that interprets the Bible more generally. Again, this process is necessarily 
circular. When a claim emerges intact from this cycle of testing, it is worthy of informing 
further biblical interpretation. I will employ this process of theological reflection and 
biblical interpretation throughout this thesis. 
 Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: A New Theology of Creation and the Spirit of God 6
(San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1985), 47. 
!4
 The thesis will begin by establishing a “process-oriented passibilist” theology, 
drawing from relevant scholarship. This approach will then be checked against the 
biblical text. This thesis claims that the biblical text features a meta-narrative of suffering 
that is revealed by and subsequently shapes a process-oriented passibilist theology. When 
the establishment of this meta-narrative and its link to process-oriented passibilist 
theology is completed, the thesis will then turn to crafting a hermeneutical strategy that 
employs the claims of this approach. Finally, the established hermeneutic will be tested 
via an analysis of the Song of Songs 3:1-5 and 5:2-8. 
Chapter 2: Theology of Powerful Suffering 
Defining Suffering 
 Defining suffering and exploring the implications of the resulting parameters is 
vital for any discussion of theological issues surrounding the phenomena of suffering. 
Before one begins to entertain the possibility of God’s suffering or attempt to explain the 
suffering of human beings, one must precisely define “suffering.” Because the 
glorification of intentional, self-inflicted, or endured pain is common throughout 
Christian history, it is important that this work establish specific parameters for the type 
of suffering discussed. The importance of avoiding these associations will be made clear 
throughout the following discussion of suffering. The hermeneutic of suffering I will 
develop will rely upon a synthesis of the theological conclusions drawn from a selection 
of theologians. Those theologians will provide us with a framework for defining 
“suffering.” 
!5
 Both Daniel Day Williams and Paul Fiddes offer a broad definition of “suffering.” 
Williams connects love and suffering intrinsically to one another, explicitly defining 
“suffering” as “the capacity to be acted upon, to be changed, moved, transformed by the 
action of or in relation to another.”  Paul Fiddes utilizes this definition in his own 7
treatment of suffering. Fiddes agrees that suffering means “change and being changed.”  8
Further, Williams and Fiddes agree that being in loving relationship with another involves 
a fundamental altering of one’s experience, an agreement to receive another’s 
contributions and be altered by them.  Within Fiddes's framework, this agreement poses 9
an existential threat to the being in relationship. Through the process of change, or 
suffering, one’s being is fundamentally altered by the existence of another.  This 10
association between suffering, relationship, and existential threat is important within 
Fiddes's definition, as he goes on to further refine suffering and its implications via this 
association. 
 Though the concept of suffering as “the capacity to be acted upon” is sufficient as 
a broad definition, we must also define what is not meant by “suffering.” Williams and 
Fiddes wrestle with the complex and dangerous implications of equating suffering to 
righteous masochism. In any context within which one attempts to justify or make 
positive the experience of suffering, one must recognize potential dangerous implications.  
 Daniel Day Williams, The Spirit and the Forms of Love (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 7
117.
 Paul S. Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 50.8
 Fiddes, 50; Williams, 117.9
 Fiddes, 51.10
!6
 Anna Mercedes attempts the task of approaching suffering mindfully, through 
which she arrives at a picture of intertwined kenosis and power that both affirms the 
goodness of kenotic sacrifice and warns against the dangers of enduring suffering 
senselessly.  Mercedes rightly draws attention to failed attempts at condemning the 11
virtue of self-sacrifice altogether in the name of reclaiming feminine power. The 
pervasive tendency of Christian theology to affirm and glorify the act of suffering is not 
without consequence. For those who identify with traditionally feminine gender roles, the 
notion of self-sacrifice, or suffering for the benefit of others, can severely limit one’s self-
actualization.  
 The synthesis of previous views that Mercedes provides offers a picture of 
feminine self-sacrifice that is anything but self-fulfilling. Women forced into submissive 
roles by the theological affirmation of self-sacrifice and giving are directly harmed by 
such affirmations.  Because Christian theology and pastoral care have been historically 12
aimed toward the mitigation of a traditionally “masculine” sin, that of self-
aggrandizement, what feminist theologians would identify as “feminine” sin has been 
either ignored or elevated to a virtuous status.  It is important to be mindful that one’s 13
elevation of suffering to a form of power or glorification does not further victimize the 
women that have such suffering thrust upon them. Because of this danger, this thesis 
seeks to differentiate between suffering that is embraced with consent and suffering that 
 Anna Mercedes, Power For: Feminism and Christ’s Self Giving (London: T & T Clark, 11
2011). 
 Mercedes, 10-11. 12
 Ibid.13
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is thrust upon someone. There is a key difference between suffering that is being accepted 
as a part of mutual relationship and suffering that is being endured as a result of cruelty or 
wrongdoing. The suffering of an abused wife is not the same as the suffering of a loving 
partner, parent, or friend. 
 The differentiation between suffering and pain is evident within the works of 
Williams and Fiddes. Williams contrasts suffering as being acted upon and suffering as 
“undergoing pain.”  Though suffering may naturally include pain, the utilization of 14
suffering that Williams employs does not necessarily account for physical pain alone, 
such as breaking a bone or recovering from a burn.  Fiddes similarly differentiates 15
between the inner feeling of suffering and the impact of suffering from outside ourselves; 
suffering is “both felt and received… an emotion and an impression.”  If suffering is 16
merely defined as an “inner state of mind,” one risks excluding the real and pressing 
suffering experienced due to worldly conditions that are beyond one’s control.  The 17
pressing implication of Fiddes's argument is that because there is a key difference 
between suffering that is merely felt and suffering that is both felt and received, there is a 
differentiation to be made between the stoic endurance of pain and the taking up of pain 
as an intrinsic part of giving relationships. Merely enduring pain for the sake of 
martyrdom, keeping peace, or fostering the self-actualization of others is not the virtue I 




 Ibid., 49. 17
!8
passible God, as the mere endurance of pain is not characteristic of an ultimate being. 
Though suffering is to be affirmed as an actuality and even affirmed as an intrinsic 
element of loving relationships, it must be taken up in order to be virtuous.  As the 18
following section will discuss, it is by taking up suffering that God ultimately claims and 
transforms suffering. It is this process of taking up suffering that is to be imitated by 
followers of Christ. The ways in which this contextualization protects the marginalized is 
to be discussed as part of a larger, later argument. 
 Dorothee Soelle also explores the dangers of extolling a particular kind of 
suffering within her works. Affliction, a particular category of suffering that Soelle draws 
from Simone Weil, involves three dimensions: physical, psychological, and social.  As 19
Soelle categorizes it, pain that does not involve all three categories is both “easier to 
overcome” and “easier to forget.”  Though affliction may not be inherently physical, it 20
manifests in physical ailments like exhaustion and mental strain.  Affliction is also 21
necessarily social, including an element of isolation from social groups due to the pain 
experienced.  Soelle’s definition of suffering contributes to her interpretation of the 22
 Dorothee Soelle utilizes the phrase “take” or “take up” in lieu of “bear” or “put up with” 18
in reference to accepting suffering. Soelle criticizes the latter expression as a description of 
suffering “tolerated, although intolerable.” This sentiment expresses an idea that Soelle would 
rather reject. Soelle prefers “take” in combination with “on, up, over” due to its implication that 
the “person doing the accepting is himself changed.” “Taking” is different from “bearing” in its 
implication of consent to and ownership of pain, according to Soelle. This is language that Fiddes 







crucifixion—God must have experienced all dimensions of affliction in order to have 
been permanently altered by it.  We will return to Soelle’s exploration of the passion in 23
later sections.  
 Soelle draws attention to the difference between affliction that is taken up and 
suffering that is endured in the name of “theological sadism.”  Soelle utilizes the term 24
“theological sadism” to describe a theological perception of God, one that she primarily 
associates with Calvin, that revels in the humiliation and suffering of creation.  To avoid 25
limiting our description of suffering to mere self-abasement, we must utilize Soelle’s full 
definition as well as Mercedes's attention to the differing traditional roles of men and 
women. Because Soelle theorizes that this “theological sadism” arises from guilt 
regarding sinfulness, Mercedes's conclusions about feminine and masculine sin are 
pertinent.  The tendency of “theological sadism” to involve self-hatred within its claims 26
about suffering is likely influenced by the social station of theologians like Calvin—the 
masculine values held aloft by a patriarchal society threaten the will and power of God. 
Naturally, scholars would reject the patriarchal values that are venerated by the society 
that surrounds them, valuing virtues like submission and humility instead. However, for 
women that would be exposed to “theological sadism,” the state of self-abasement 
extolled by this theology closely mirrors the oppressive state that they already experience 






are gender non-conforming. The “theology of sadism” that Soelle defines depicts 
suffering in a way that cannot speak to the affliction felt by the marginalized. Self-
abasement only offers hope to those who possess privileged power in the first place. This 
implication is one of the many reasons why defining suffering is so important. A 
theologically useful understanding of suffering must be suffering that is not sadistic or 
masochistic and with which all readers can identify. 
 What, then, does suffering look like practically? Suffering, as it is to be utilized 
within this thesis, implies a choice on the part of the sufferer. With Soelle, Fiddes agrees 
that meaningful suffering requires that the process of suffering be actively chosen.  As 27
Fiddes writes,  “Though suffering has befallen us, we choose it as our own; or for the 
sake of love we choose a path where it is likely that suffering will be imposed upon us, 
and we make that our own.”  I will refer to this active process of taking up suffering as 28
one’s own as “powerful suffering.” Powerful suffering is different from suffering 
passively endured, ignored, or romanticized. As Fiddes elaborates, powerful suffering 
naturally involves anticipation and expectation.  This may take the form of anticipating 29
future suffering (in the case of participating in relationships with the knowledge that 






Fiddes, therefore, argues that powerful suffering leads the sufferer toward social justice 
and the future elimination of the state of senseless suffering.  31
 Though there is surely much more to be said about suffering and its various states, 
the most pressing concerns have been addressed. This thesis differentiates between 
senseless suffering and powerful suffering. The following sections will focus on the latter 
and its implications. First, a theological argument will be formed regarding God’s 
suffering. Afterward, the consequences of such a theology for humanity will be explored. 
Establishing a Process-Oriented Passibilist Approach to Theology 
Impassibilist Approaches 
 The disparity between the classical picture of God’s impassible being and the 
gospel witness of God’s incarnational suffering has been a broadly debated issue within 
theology for centuries. Divine impassibility has been classically tied to declarations of 
God’s magnanimity.  For many theologians, the impassibility of God is a non-negotiable 32
aspect of God’s nature, without which God would cease to be God. What is the origin of 
this claim? For those who defend it so passionately, what is its purpose? To provide 
context for later counterclaims, I will offer a brief overview of divine impassibility and its 
relevant implications. 
 Just as suffering is difficult to define precisely, so also is divine impassibility a 
difficult concept to succinctly describe. The wealth of discussion involving any aspect of 
God’s nature stems from the difficulty in arriving at universal definitions. Richard E. 
 Ibid.31
 James Keating and Thomas Joseph White, Divine Impassibility and the Mystery of Human 32
Suffering (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Pub, 2009), 1.
!12
Creel, for example, provides eight definitions for impassibility: (1) “lacking all emotions” 
(excluding bliss); (2) “in a state of mind that is imperturbable;” (3) “insusceptible to 
distraction from resolve;” (4) “having a will determined entirely by oneself;” (5) “cannot 
be affected by an outside force;” (6) “cannot be prevented from achieving one’s purpose;” 
(7) “has no susceptibility to negative emotions;” (8) “cannot be affected by an outside 
force or changed by oneself.”   33
 It is in Creel’s fifth definition that Fiddes, Williams, and Soelle would likely find 
common ground. Some of Creel’s definitions of divine impassibility only address 
portions of divine impassibility’s many implications, allowing for compromise with little 
consequence on the part of the impassibilist. For instance, any claim that God lacks in all 
emotions except bliss (Creel’s first definition) or is not susceptible to negative emotions 
(Creel’s seventh definition) is easily dismissed as lacking in biblical support. Because 
these depictions of impassibility are easy to accept without sacrificing other attributes, it 
is important to distinguish them from those definitions (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8) that actively 
pose a challenge for notions of omnipotence, immutability, omniscience, or 
transcendence. If one is to favor a nuanced view of divine impassibility, as Creel attempts 
to do, one cannot merely concede that God experiences emotions.  34
 Richard E. Creel, Divine Impassibility: An Essay in Philosophical Theology, (Cambridge: 33
Cambridge University Press, 1986), 9.
 Creel’s final summation of a nuanced theory of divine impassibility rejects the claim that 34
God experiences emotions, but does accept that God experiences the changing of time. Creel does 
not argue that God is “in time,” but rather that God acknowledges the passing of one moment into 
another. This is the extent of Creel’s acceptance of any form of passibility of God, separate from 
the incarnation (204-207).
!13
 What, then, is the purpose of arguing in favor of an impassible God? For the 
theologians who do so, the transcendence and independence of God is at stake.  35
Unfortunately, modern defenders of divine impassibility only superficially address what 
drives them to revive support for impassibility as a theological doctrine.  The 36
methodology utilized by impassibilist writers, however, may provide insight into their 
motivations. For example, James Keating and Thomas Joseph White introduce their 
collection of essays regarding divine impassibility with a central question: how can we 
hope to be saved from suffering by a God who is not free from suffering?  How could 37
we possibly hope to worship a God who is weak? This notion is shared by Creel when he 
presents the “universal” point of agreement between theologians on the issue of 
impassibility: God must be impassible in nature, because “no being whose very nature is 
vulnerable to change could be worthy of unconditional worship.”  38
 For impassibilists, the logical starting point appears to be creation. God cannot 
create out of desire for creation, because that would necessitate that God be changed or 
moved by creation.  God creates “that there might also be others to enjoy the great good 39
of existence under his sovereignty.”  For Creel, suffering is a great evil, but is 40
 Keating and White, 1-4.35
 Creel and Gavrilyuk do not seem driven by any pressing theological need to defend these 36
ideas, but rather feel as if the traditional doctrine of divine impassibility has been mistreated or 
mishandled in modernity. Creel. Paul L. Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible God: The 
Dialectics of Patristic Thought. Oxford Early Christian Studies, (New York: Oxford University 
Press), 2006.





overwhelmed by the good of existence, so much so that anyone who suffers would 
willingly choose to suffer again in order to experience God’s presence.  As we will see, 41
the view of suffering presented by impassibilist theologians contrasts starkly with the 
understanding of theologians like Fiddes. 
 Finally, for some, the notion of divine impassibility is central to the unique quality 
of the Christian faith. Paul Gavrilyuk, for example, defends the classical doctrine of 
divine impassibility as a special paradox that Christian tradition upholds.  Gavrilyuk 42
argues that the dichotomy between impassibilist Hellenistic philosophy and the suffering 
God of the biblical text is merely a scholarly construction.  This scholarly portrayal of 43
both Hellenistic philosophy and the biblical text considers neither the complexity of 
Hellenistic thought nor the hesitancy with which the biblical text ascribes emotion to 
God.  Gavrilyuk rejects the critique that early Christian theologians were somehow 44
limited by Hellenistic notions of an apathetic God, choosing instead to explore the 
complexity of the patristic conversation surrounding divine impassibility.  The incarnate 45
suffering of an impassible God, according to Gavrilyuk, is a central feature of the 








 Gavrilyuk ultimately arrives at a defense of Cyril of Alexandria, favoring a view 
of divine impassibility that is inherently paradoxical.  J. Warren Smith further elaborates 47
upon Cyril of Alexandria’s defense of a God that “suffers impassibly.”  Cyril’s defense 48
of divine impassibility attempts to retain both Christ’s suffering and God’s immutability. 
In doing so, Cyril claims that God suffers in the incarnation without experiencing 
change.  Cyril makes a distinction between the suffering that God experiences on the 49
cross and the degenerative suffering that human beings may experience as a result of 
illness, emotional trauma, or impending death.  If God were to experience degenerative 50
suffering, God would become lesser.  Suffering of this nature would not allow God to 51
continue to be God by definition, as it would make God lesser. Further, by voluntarily 
entering into a state of suffering and subsequently remaining unchanged by it, God 
retains impassibility.  The state of suffering must be one that is entered into by God, 52
rather than an inherent part of God’s nature, because a God that suffers inherently has no 
need for an incarnation that can suffer, even impassibly.   53
 The retention of this traditional paradox—the impassible suffering of God— is 
central for impassibilists like Gavrilyuk. This centrality is directly related to God’s value 
 Ibid, 135-172.47
 J. Warren Smith, “Suffering Impassibly: Christ’s Passion in Cyril of Alexandria’s 48
Soteriology,” Pro Ecclesia 11, no. 4 (2002).
 Ibid., 470. 49





as an object of worship. For God to remain God by definition, God must remain 
unchanging in nature. An unstable God of constant change is not worthy of worship and 
cannot provide safety or stability for humanity. A God of this kind provides no hope. As 
we will continue to explore, passibilist theologians have met the challenge of defending a 
passible God that is worthy of worship by reorienting the classical understanding of 
suffering and power. 
Passibility and Wrath 
 There are many nuances among arguments in favor of divine passibility. Though 
this thesis will favor Paul Fiddes's argument for divine passibility as given in The 
Creative Suffering of God, the problems associated with other views will be addressed 
now. We will begin by comparing the views of Paul Fiddes and Kazō Kitamori. 
 According to Kitamori’s account of suffering, the reality that we experience is 
necessarily and fundamentally flawed.  Because humanity has sinned and sin must be 54
punished, God feels wrath.  However, God also possesses the will to love creation, even 55
as it is broken.  As Kitamori summarizes, “The ‘pain’ of God reflects his will to love the 56
object of his wrath…. God who must sentence sinners to death fought with God who 
wishes to love them. The fact that this fighting God is not two different gods but the same 
God causes his pain.”  Kitamori follows Luther in affirming this tension. In the 57





crucifixion, God experienced God’s own wrath and was wounded by it, initiating 
atonement.   58
 In contrast to Creel’s claim that there is a universal agreement among scholars 
regarding the impassibility of God’s nature, Kitamori argues that it is in God’s nature to 
be in pain.  Kitamori describes the crucifixion as the “astonishing fact of the gospel,” a 59
shocking revelation for which the church has lost its fascination.  According to Kitamori, 60
God undergoes literal death through Christ. God is thus viewed as capable of 
experiencing a fundamental alteration of self. The death of Christ is brought about by the 
incredible tension between God’s need to punish sinners (wrath) and God’s love for 
creation. When Christ dies, God changes fundamentally. Because the death of Christ is 
central to all of Kitamori’s theological claims, the potential implication of God’s nature 
changing is not an issue that Kitamori addresses. The immutability of God’s nature is not 
as important as the centrality of Christ’s death. 
 Fiddes offers an alternative account of God’s pain. We cannot understand God’s 
suffering as a conflict between wrath and love because this suffering would be beyond 
human understanding and entirely apart from human experience.  Because of this, 61
Kitamori’s explanation for God’s suffering does not adequately address the way in which 
humanity practically experiences suffering. The arguments of Kitamori and Fiddes also 






Fiddes intertwines concepts from process thought into his discussion of divine passibility, 
he avoids the tension that Kitamori finds within a God who both actively punishes sin 
and unconditionally loves. Despite these differences, Fiddes agrees with Kitamori that 
there are a vast array of texts within the Old Testament that depict God as experiencing 
pain or turmoil in response to sin or its results.  The two theologians differ in their 62
treatment of these texts and their resulting depictions of God, a dialogue that will become 
important as we turn to the biblical text later in this thesis. 
Divine Passibility in Process Theology 
 The aim of this thesis is not to present a new view of divine passibility. Rather, I 
intend to contextualize existing theories as they relate to the biblical text and to utilize 
them to inform a new strategy for interpreting the text. The following overview of 
process-oriented passibilist theories will attempt to provide the first foundational claim 
for the hermeneutic to be developed: God powerfully suffers. The following overview 
will also address both the problems associated with impassibilist theories and how a 
process-oriented approach can solve problems associated with non-process passibilist 
theories. 
 The argument that Fiddes presents in favor of divine passibility begins in the 
same place as process thought: human experience.  The classical understanding of divine 63
glorification in the form of coercive power and punishment also arises from human 




realization of power and the ultimate expression of divine power—the cross.  Langdon 64
Gilkey argues that human awareness of temporality leads to the conception of what is 
good as exclusively that which provides invulnerability to evil.  What is “good” then 65
takes the form of changelessness, eventually leading to the exaltation of power, wealth, 
and “passionless indifference.”  In contrast with Gavrilyuk, Gilkey connects this human 66
tendency to equate goodness with invulnerability to Hellenistic conceptions of perfection 
that were later echoed by the early church.  It is important to note that the connection 67
between invulnerable power and goodness arises from a human need for security, echoing 
the concern of many scholars who defend divine impassibility. 
 The key difference between Fiddes's assessment of the attributes of God and 
many classic perspectives is that Fiddes recognizes that the ability to inflict suffering 
upon others, expressed in its extreme form as coercive omnipotence, is a contradiction to 
the revelation of God’s character. Similarly, God has not escaped or avoided suffering, 
but has knowingly and willfully embraced it as a part of God’s nature.  In agreement 68
with Soelle, Fiddes asserts that the empowerment we feel as we take up suffering and 
make it our own must also belong to God, lest we possess power that God does not or 
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cannot possess.  Fiddes's argument addresses the claim made by Creel that affirming a 69
passible God would result in a “religion of pity” in which God is made to be vulnerable 
and weak.  In contrast, Fiddes's passible God possesses an incredible power that is only 70
accessible through the most divine form of love, relationship, and suffering. 
 Fiddes asks a very different set of fundamental questions in comparison to 
impassibilist thinkers. If we can experience non-being, can God experience non-being or 
is non-being alien to God?  What does it mean for God to experience something new or 71
to possess a future?  These sticky questions drive Fiddes's argument. Though the 72
necessity of suffering in relationship is present within Fiddes's work, his appeal to the 
experience of anticipating non-being by God is most intriguing. Essentially, Fiddes 
attempts to answer a question central to Christian belief: How can God die? While God 
does not experience death—as no living or non-living being can experience death itself—
God experiences the anticipation of death, or relatedness to non-being.  From creation, 73
God struggles between being and non-being, forming order out of disorder.  It is in this 74
real experience that the weight of the cross takes on meaning. Through the incarnation, 
the Trinity experiences a multiplicity of suffering that includes physical death and 
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alienation, but is not ultimately consumed by it.  God dies, but remains God, and 75
becomes more glorified as a result.  There is an important implication to be drawn from 76
Fiddes's argument: God changes as a result of suffering death and becomes more 
powerful in the process of suffering. This not only establishes the notion of a powerful 
God that can change fundamentally, but also establishes the role of suffering as a form of 
glorifying power. 
 The risk that suffering poses for immutability is not a concern for Fiddes, but is 
actually the vehicle of God’s glorification. Fiddes equates the “glory of God” to both the 
divine nature and hope for the future, the latter of which implies that God increases in 
glory over time as creation approaches the eschaton.  Moltmann also characterizes 77
glorification in this way, relating it to a movement from nothingness to hope of 
liberation.  The claim that God moves toward greater glorification, along with creation, 78
allows for a God that changes over time but gains greater stability as a result. God is not 
static, but moves toward a goal of future hope.  
 Fiddes's reorientation of divine attributes is characteristic of most process 
theologies.  Bruce Epperly, for example, distinguishes between two theological 79
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assumes God to be mysterious, generally beyond understanding, and fundamentally 
transcendent, the kataphatic approach (what God is) assumes God to be revealed in 
creation.  According to Epperly, a process-oriented approach to theology will typically 81
radicalize the classic trinity of “omni” words associated with God (omnipresence, 
omnipotence, and omniscience).  God’s omniscience is understood to be knowledge of 82
all things actual and possible, but constrained by temporality, meaning that perfect 
knowledge evolves over time as new possibilities are generated.  Though omniscience is 83
peripheral to the process-oriented passibilist approaches examined here, the attributes of 
omnipotence and omnipresence are central. Where Fiddes's approach differs from 
Williams is in this emphasis. As Epperly explains, a process-oriented theology will 
generally emphasize divine omnipresence, establishing God as present “everywhere in all 
things.”  Williams focuses upon divine omnipresence in his defense of divine suffering. 84
Williams’ argument more closely reflects those that Creel directly refutes—God is 
revealed through direct contact with creation, moving through human history and sharing 
directly in our suffering.   85
 Rather than focusing upon omnipresence, though arguments like those of 
Williams are also represented, Fiddes's argument emphasizes a reorientation of divine 
omnipotence, as explained above. The traditional understanding of valuable power, what 
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 Ibid, 22. 82
 Ibid.83
 Ibid, 23.84
 Williams, 5. 85
!23
Robert Mesle calls “unilateral power,” has been attributed to God apophatically under the 
assumption that coercive, unilateral power is preferable over the “weakness” of 
suffering.  In other words, the ability to control or direct others without being affected in 86
return is traditionally viewed as more desirable than being affected through change. The 
king who possesses the power to subjugate citizens is more magnificent than the citizens 
who suffer under his rule. Therefore, God must be like the king. This conclusion is not 
drawn kataphatically, but apophatically. This means that reorienting our understanding of 
what kind of power is desirable allows us to address passibility via a much easier route.  
 Rather than attempting to disprove a kataphatic claim (God does not suffer), we 
are instead open to reaffirm a classic apophatic claim (God is omnipotent) in a new way. 
God is affirmed as the most powerful being, but what does this power entail? This is the 
reorientation that Fiddes provides. Mesle, though largely writing from a secular position, 
makes a similar claim:  
Nor can God remain unaffected by the world: God is the only one who has the 
strength, the ability, to be open to every single experience in the world. God is the 
only one who can take everything in, integrate it with God’s own infinitely ancient 
wisdom, and create God’s self out of that relationship in each moment. God is the 
only one who can then feed back to every creature in the world a lure and call toward 
those possibilities that are best for it.   87
 In process, or becoming, creation grows, transforms, and becomes new. How 
could God remain God without participating in this process? Rather than supposing that 
God cannot change, a process-oriented passibilist approach insists that God must change, 
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because change is the ultimate form of glorification. Further, Fiddes argues that God 
desires this participation, for it allows God to form meaningful relationships with 
creation, be altered by it, and be moved to end its suffering through glorification.   88
 God’s intent is demonstrated in the cross, as is stated by Dietrich Bonhoeffer:  
God lets himself be pushed out of the world on to the cross. He is weak and 
powerless in the world, and that is precisely the way, the only way, in which he is 
with us and helps us…. only the suffering God can help. To that extent we may 
say that the development towards the world’s coming of age outlined above, 
which has done away with a false conception of God, opens up a way of seeing 
the God of the Bible, who wins power and space in the world by his weakness.   89
 To recognize God’s omnipotence as weakness is to reorient our understanding of 
desirable power to more accurately reflect our lived experience in creation. Moltmann 
addresses the critique of omnipotence by protest atheism, noting the movement’s 
sentiment that “a God who cannot suffer is poorer than any man. For a God who is 
incapable of suffering is a being who cannot be involved. Suffering and injustice do not 
affect him…. Finally, a God who is only omnipotent is in himself an incomplete being, 
for he cannot experience helplessness and powerlessness.”   90
 Moltmann answers this critique by offering a God that suffers and is therefore 
powerful in doing so. When suffering is understood to be powerful, capable of making 
one better, more compassionate, more loving, and more complete in relationship to 
others, God can be understood as powerful in suffering. This is the great paradox of 
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Christian hope, not that the unsuffering God suffers in Christ, but that the suffering God 
is most powerful in weakness. 
Praxis in Powerful Suffering 
 What, then, are we to do with the conclusion that God suffers? How is humanity 
to respond to this revelation, and how ought our practical, pastoral concerns shift? As 
Moltmann claims, “It is in suffering that the whole human question about God arises.”  91
The reality of suffering is inarguable, especially after the horrors of war and inhuman 
atrocities we have witnessed in the twentieth century. That we suffer is granted, but begs 
the question of God’s suffering. Once the question of God’s suffering is resolved, how 
ought the Christian approach to human suffering change in response? 
 It is at this point that the warnings of Soelle and Mercedes must be discussed 
again. How can a theology of suffering avoid condoning abuse and perpetuating cycles of 
violence? How does a theology of suffering advocate for the abused partner or 
disenfranchised person of color? Soelle openly dismisses Christian approaches to 
suffering that do not adequately address these concerns. Both “Christian masochism” and 
“Christian apathy” are condemned by Soelle as misguided, or even malicious attempts at 
gaining meaning from suffering.   92
 The pastor who advises a woman suffering within an abusive marriage to forgive 
her persecutor, return to her domestic duties, or otherwise endure her suffering misleads 
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the woman into believing that her suffering is, in itself, redemptive.  The pastor misleads 93
the woman into believing that the endurance of her suffering alone is Christ-like. 
However, within the framework that has been established by process-oriented 
passibilism, i.e., a theology of powerful suffering, the abused woman may have access to 
better guidance. An understanding of suffering as exclusively evil or a product of God’s 
wrath leads to the conclusions against which Soelle warns. Suffering is viewed as either a 
sign of misdeeds on the part of the sufferer or a necessary catalyst for personal salvation 
and growth. Neither perspective, either Soelle’s Christian masochism or apathy, assist the 
sufferer practically. 
 Powerful suffering, however, offers the potential to move Christians to social 
justice. As Moltmann argues, those who love cannot stand the suffering of another and 
are moved to put an end to it.  Powerfully suffering in love for the other results in more 94
than mere acknowledgement of another’s pain or a search for the other’s guilty sins.  95
The sufferer in love experiences and is changed by the cries of the other and cannot avoid 
being impacted by them.  This is why choosing to be in relation with others is such a 96
difficult and coveted choice. By choosing to be in relation with others, we actively take 
up the risk of suffering with them. Choosing to love others meaningfully, as Christ 
 The same could be said for men or the gender non-conforming suffering the abuses of 93
spouses, parents, or any others. Soelle and Mercedes focus specifically on the experiences of 
women, but this treatment of suffering is not exclusive to this perspective. However, it ought to 
be noted that the way in which women are instructed to deal with their suffering is often different 





willfully chose death, is to choose to open oneself up to suffering. Because it has already 
been established that God is the being who suffers supremely, to choose the possibility of 
suffering with the other is to choose a path that is Christ-like. This is the path of the 
imago dei.  97
 Despite the appeal of this claim, it does not yet fully avoid Soelle’s warning 
against the Christian tendency toward self-abasement. After all, if the abused wife is told 
that she ought to suffer for others, would this not be counter-productive? Would she 
simply continue to suffer as a martyr? This concern is addressed at length by both Soelle 
and Mercedes. Mercedes utilizes psychological insights to pose an argument against 
characterizing the sufferer as a martyr. Women who suffer abuse at the hands of spouses, 
parents, or other authority figures are often evaluated under the same misguided 
framework that informs the notion that unilateral, coercive power is supremely 
desirable.  Women have typically only been seen as “resistant” to their abusers if their 98
resistance is physical, a characterization that stems from the patriarchal understanding of 
control as physical dominance.   99
 However, Mercedes recognizes other strategies that have been employed by 
women and other marginalized groups in abusive circumstances that are actively 
resistant, but often misunderstood as passive. These methods can take the form of 
listlessness, silence, or “learned hopelessness,” but, notably, may also take the form of 
 The concept of imago dei is discussed at greater length in the following section.97
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kenotic self-giving.  Mercedes recounts a number of stories from women who have 100
survived and overcome their abuse by loving others passionately. These accounts of 
resistance as self-giving may take the form of children refusing to take up their abusive 
parent’s racist language or a mother prioritizing the lives of her children over the escape 
of suicide.  While Mercedes is careful to qualify that these forms ought not be 101
prioritized over alleviating the suffering of these women in whatever way possible, her 
point is that not all self-giving can be classified as passive acceptance.  For many, 102
reclaiming suffering for themselves and acting in compassion for the suffering of others 
allows them to resist those who would inflict pain upon them.  
 Soelle develops this concept further. The goal of powerful suffering is not to free 
oneself from suffering, but to liberate others.  As Soelle writes, “God has no other 103
hands than ours.”  By taking up suffering and reclaiming it, we regain the ability to 104
seek out and liberate those who suffer innocently and are helpless to stop it.  Soelle 105
argues that the Christian is in a unique position to end the suffering of others. A Christian 
soul is one that has already experienced the void of alienation from God—the dark night 
of the soul—and has been faithful through it.  The Christian has loved God even within 106
the void, and believes in hope for the future. When rightly understood, the suffering of 








God with creation and the subsequent taking up of suffering by the Christian can lead to 
greater efforts in eliminating suffering for humanity at large. As Soelle poetically 
illustrates, “He who does not weep needs no utopia; to him who only weeps God remains 
mute.”  It is the unique Christian quality of finding hope on the cross that enables its 107
adherents to fight harder for the end, a future of eschatological glorification.   108
 Soelle offers her contemporaries, the leaders of the civil rights movement, as 
exemplary of hope that emboldens one to act. Though they suffer in their movement, 
beaten and demonized, they do not stray from their hope. They “seek and produce 
confrontation as they make suffering visible.”  As Christ, they do not run from suffering 109
in hopes of escaping it, but pursue it so that it may be theirs to claim.  
 Contemporary experience offers parallels to Soelle’s example. In early 2020, the 
death of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and others rekindled the flames of the nation-
wide Black Lives Matter movement. Every day, as I witnessed countless protestors being 
gassed, shot, and beaten in the streets, I could not help comparing them to Christ. With 
their signs and their words, they took up the cross and confronted suffering so that it 
might be visible. They did not shy from the video footage of Floyd’s murder or the reality 
of systemic racism. They boldly proclaimed it, never backing down from their 
persecution. I witnessed powerful suffering—the suffering of God—in motion, and I 
sincerely believe that their efforts will be remembered as a momentous historical 
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occasion. It is this suffering that we all ought to emulate—suffering that we own and that 
allows us to work toward a future in which no one is forced to suffer helplessly. 
The Biblical Meta-Narrative of Powerful Suffering 
 Though biblical interpretation is an inherently cyclical endeavor, petitioning and 
challenging the conclusions of reason, experience, and tradition in its continuous 
examination of scripture, theology is too often the victim of isolation. This is especially 
the case for process theology, which can be accurately critiqued for its emphasis on 
secular philosophy and lack of emphasis on biblical analysis. The most comprehensive 
theological position is that which tests itself against the biblical text. Of course, some 
theologians may choose to accept the contradictions present between their theological 
conclusions and what the biblical text may be interpreted as asserting. However, it is the 
position of this thesis that a theological position is most complete when it is reaffirmed 
via evidence within the biblical text. Similarly, the practice of biblical interpretation is 
most valid when it is informed by a theological position. It is thus vital for the process-
oriented passibilist position examined in the preceding section to be grounded in the 
biblical text. The following section will attempt to test the theological claims outlined 
above against the biblical canon. The thesis that I will attempt to demonstrate is this: The 
biblical canon  presents an overarching narrative of suffering that begins with creation, 110
is refined through various conflicts, and is completed in eschatological hope.  
 This thesis specifically references the Protestant canon, excluding the apocrypha, though 110
the arguments presented retain their validity irrespective of one’s choice of Christian canon. 
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Creation 
 The creation texts within Genesis perform the role of introducing the canon’s 
primary protagonists—the two figures most important to those who seek understanding 
within the biblical text—God and humanity. Through a narrative of creation, the text 
establishes who God is, what God’s purposes are, and the role of humanity in those 
purposes. Though the creation narratives are not the first texts to be written or established 
within the biblical canon, they are presumably placed at the beginning for a reason. 
Because Genesis provides context for the texts that follow, it also provides context for the 
overarching narrative argued for within this thesis. In relation to the biblical story of 
suffering, the Genesis creation narratives serve two key functions. First, Genesis 1 
establishes the concept of the imago dei and the nature of humanity as inherently 
relational. Second, Genesis 2-3 provides the first case of suffering on the part of both God 
and humanity, establishing “suffering” as a central theme within the canon. 
 Genesis 1:26-28 presents several challenges in terms of translation and 
interpretation. The plural pronouns utilized in reference to God—“let us make humankind 
in our image, according to our likeness”—seem to contradict the monotheistic leanings of 
modern Judaism and Christianity (Gen. 1:26).  Naturally, later developments in 111
Christian Trinitarian theology provided alternate routes of interpretation in response to 
this verse. As Moltmann argues, despite the probable lack of intentionality on the part of 
 Unless otherwise noted, all biblical quotations are taken from the New Revised Standard 111
Version Bible, copyright 1989, Division of Christian Education of the National Council of the 
Churches of Christ in the United States of America. Used by permission. All rights reserved.
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the author, this plural language has been reinterpreted in light of the later gospel and 
provided the foundation for Trinitarian understanding of this passage.  112
 Though a Trinitarian interpretation was surely not intended by the biblical author, 
the existence of later Trinitarian interpretations of the passage complicate the connected 
doctrine of the imago dei. The parallel between the plural God and created humanity 
poses a challenge. What does it mean to be made in God’s image, especially given that 
God is to be understood as three mutually indwelling persons? Moltmann addresses other 
interpretations of the imago dei in response to this challenge, making a distinction 
between the theological and anthropological understanding of humanity’s “likeness to 
God.”   113
 Analogies to substance, form, proportionality, and relation all serve primarily to 
differentiate humanity from other animals or parts of creation, rather than beginning with 
humanity’s relation to God.  The imago dei is a statement of God’s relationship with 114
humanity before it is a statement of the nature of humanity.  Much like the later 115
differentiation between Adam and Eve, “the God who creates for himself his image on 
earth finds his correspondence in that image.”  Humanity is created to correspond to 116
God—to be in relationship with God. Humanity, then, not only serves as God’s 






counterpart but as a revelation of God’s “splendour” and representative within creation.  117
It is not enough, then, to interpret humanity’s “likeness to God” as an anthropological 
feature. Rather, it is the whole existence of humanity that bears the imago dei.   118
 Moltmann argues that humanity’s inheritance of the imago dei is similar to 
representative divinity within Egyptian royal theology, wherein the Pharaoh is interpreted 
as a “copy of God.”  The Genesis reinterpretation of this concept has, according to 119
Moltmann, “revolutionary political potential,” as it redistributes the Egyptian conception 
of likeness to God, removing it from its place among royals and attributing it to humanity 
at large.  The imago dei, then, becomes a radical statement of equality and shared 120
divinity, reaffirming and even emphasizing the theological claims made earlier in this 
thesis. Not only are humans only complete in the imago dei when in relationship to one 
another, but this relationship is not one that resembles a unilateral power structure that 
excludes the masses. The king is not the only one who shares in God’s likeness. Rather, 
the entirety of humanity bears this kinship and, most importantly, those who live in 
relation to others exemplify it in its fullest sense. 
 I have previously argued that true relational power inherently involves suffering, 
as suffering is the capacity to be acted upon. As Genesis 1 establishes the relationship of 
God and humanity, Genesis 2-3 provides the first account of what precisely being in 






ability to be self-sufficiently inter-relational. In order to be fulfilled, the singular person 
must find a suitable being that corresponds to it (Gen. 2:18). Despite a great deal of 
searching among the creatures that had already been created, the person’s counterpart 
could not be found (vv. 18-19). Finally, God separates the singular person that was 
created in God’s likeness and splits it into two (vv. 21-23). The two persons were not only 
similar in form and likeness to God (v. 23) but could regain their interpenetrative 
relationality, once again becoming “one flesh” (v. 24).  
 Adam and Eve are not only representative of the imago dei that is shared by all of 
humanity, but also demonstrate humanity’s purpose and goal of relationality. In the 
relationship between Adam and Eve, there is no unilateral power, but relational power—
neither is made to be ashamed (v. 24). However, when Adam and Eve obtain the ability to 
discern between good and evil (Gen. 3:1-7), becoming susceptible to death and non-
being, they experience one of Soelle’s three qualities of affliction: isolation.  The two 121
become estranged to one another, and they feel shame. Quickly, when accused by God, 
the two turn against one another in blame (vv. 8-13), fleeing from the possibility of 
suffering and further isolating themselves. They abandon the relationality that they were 
created to embody. The couple chooses the knowledge of non-being, gaining the great 
burden of suffering in anticipation of death (vv. 17-19). In their creative activities, they 
will feel physical and mental pain (vv. 16-18). With their newfound freedom, humanity 




 The following summary concludes the narrative: “Then the LORD God said, 
‘See, the man has become like one of us, knowing good and evil; and now, he might 
reach out his hand and take also from the tree of life, and eat, and live forever’” (v. 22). 
In taking from the tree, humanity gained in its likeness to God. Humanity gained the 
necessary side-effect of the knowledge of non-being, which is suffering. If God already 
possessed this knowledge, God must also be understood as possessing this suffering. On 
its own, this affliction is not positive, but it can be taken up in love and relationship to be 
transformed. Thus, the central conflict of the biblical narrative is established: both 
humanity and God suffer as a result of their shared nature, but paradoxically seek an end 
to suffering through relationship with one another. 
 Throughout the other chapters of Genesis, other stories of suffering and 
relationship are offered. The first death is experienced, solidifying the finite nature of 
humanity (4). God is grieved by humanity, feels regret for the act of creation, and moves 
to destroy the earth (6-9).  God dialogues with Abraham and changes God’s course of 122
action (18:22-33). In the first opening chapters of Genesis, God is depicted as suffering in 
relation to humanity and changing as a result of the petitions of human beings. It is clear 
that the God of Genesis is not a God that is impassible—the God of Genesis is deeply 
related to creation, moved by the actions and words of those human beings with whom 
 Notably, Gen. 6:6 is the first instance within the Hebrew Bible of ָעַצב (Strong’s H6087), 122
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God is in relationship, and is inextricably tied to the fate chosen by creation within the 
Garden. 
Exodus 
 “Getting free of existing suffering,” what Soelle describes as “the greatest theme 
of the Bible,” is the focus of the book of Exodus at large.  The Israelites are presented 123
as “groaning” in their state of slavery, crying out (Exod. 2:23-25). God takes notice of 
their suffering and remembers God’s covenantal relationship with them (25). The 
narrative then presents the story of the collaborative effort between God and Moses to 
free the Israelites from their suffering. The plight of the Israelites is undeserved—it is not 
a punishment for their misdeeds or some result of their own actions.  Their suffering is 124
not God’s will.  Rather, it is the will of the overlord, Pharaoh, to inflict punishment 125
upon them in the name of greater productivity and material wealth.   126
 The Pharaoh is a being of unilateral power occupied with creaturely passions. 
Fittingly, the Pharaoh is depicted as a character that rarely shows personal agency or 
emotion. The puzzling meaning of the “hardening” of Pharaoh’s heart (which comes to 
fruition first in 7:13) is indicative of his lack of agency within the Exodus narrative itself. 
Pharaoh serves a purpose as an obstacle, being objectified rather than having any real 
power. This both establishes the Pharaoh’s power as illusory and empowers God and 
Moses in comparison. The Pharaoh’s primary character trait is impassibility, unwavering 





and dispassionate resolve in the face of Moses’ requests. This is contrasted with God’s 
cooperative dialogue with Moses, a sign of God’s willingness to be acted upon by a 
human agent. The immovable Pharaoh and his various arbitrary cruelties are absurd so 
that they may highlight the alternative: the compassionate, suffering Yahweh.  This 127
contrast is central in the Hebrew Bible’s presentation of the narrative.  
 Throughout the texts that follow Exodus, the remembrance of slavery in Egypt 
becomes a warning, promise, and ritual. Even today, Yahweh’s characterization as the 
God that released the Israelites from captivity is cherished as one of the most important 
tenets of Judaism. Yahweh’s covenant with Israel builds upon a foundation of 
compassionate recognition of suffering. Following from the establishment of the imago 
dei and the first demonstration of both divine and human suffering, the exodus from 
Egypt emphasizes the importance of acknowledging and taking up suffering so that it 
may be conquered. In this narrative, the biblical authors tackle the problem of suffering 
imposed by unilateral power and provide an alternative that gives them hope to defeat it. 
Reexamination in Exile 
 The contemplation of suffering by biblical authors continues through the other 
books of the Hebrew Bible. The destruction of the divided kingdom of Israel, first by the 
Assyrians and again by the Babylonians, is a frequent concern that the Hebrew Bible 
addresses. The exile of the Israelites from their promised land that followed these 
instances of horrific destruction is also incredibly important, both in the Hebrew Bible 
and in Jewish religious tradition. For a people group that placed a great emphasis on the 
 Ibid.127
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land that they claimed, tying their identity and religious faith to the land itself, being 
forcibly removed from that land was devastating and demanded examination. As many of 
the texts of the Hebrew Bible date to the post-exilic period, within which the Israelites 
attempted to find the purpose or cause of their affliction, the question of suffering can be 
found frequently throughout. Among the explorations of suffering to be found within the 
Hebrew Bible, aside from those previously discussed, the topic seems to be most 
pronounced among the eighth-century prophets and the poetic books. Among these, two 
specific books will be highlighted for their relevance to the discussion at hand: Hosea and 
Job.  
 Hosea’s marital metaphor for the destruction of Israel and impending exile is a 
difficult and violent one. The utilization of brutality against women to illustrate God’s 
intentions is a problem that must be addressed with care. While there is no question that 
the metaphorical presentation in Hosea of Israel as a whoring wife is an insufficient one, 
there may be more to glean from the book of Hosea than its violence (Hos. 2:2-15). The 
decision to compare Israel to a wife and Yahweh to a husband is an informative one. 
Though the metaphor may not be one that depicts the equality of two partners 
historically, associating the relationship between Yahweh and Israel as a covenantal 
marriage suggests that each partner is connected to and deeply affected by the other. Just 
as Israel is influenced by God, God is influenced by the actions of Israel and the 
Israelites. Unfortunately, the actions of the Israelites put the relationship in jeopardy. God 
does not punish the people directly, but gives them up to the “natural consequences of 
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their own actions.”  The folly of Israel is moving away from relationship with God, 128
toward non-being.  
 As the Israelites turn away from relationship with God, they also turn away from 
relationship with one another, primarily as seen in the clash between the social classes. 
The eighth-century prophets, including Hosea, focus on social justice in response to this 
trajectory toward non-being. The consequence of turning away from the suffering of 
others in self-preservation is further alienation and the stagnation of oneself. God is not, 
however, indifferent to the suffering that the Israelites endure as a result of their turning 
away. Rather, Hosea is careful to demonstrate that God laments the suffering of Israel.  129
Because humanity is autonomous, human beings can choose estrangement from God. As 
this choice results in the suffering of humanity, it also results in the suffering of God.  130
God laments aloud, “How can I give you up, Ephraim? How can I hand you over, O 
Israel? How can I make you like Admah? How can I treat you like Zeboiim? My heart 
recoils within me; my compassion grows warm and tender” (11:8). God is stricken by the 
decisions made by human beings, moved to compassion by God’s desire for relationship 





ability to choose non-being. The great struggle and affliction of God is this consequence, 
and the alleviation of suffering becomes the most vital goal.  131
 Job also explores the problem of suffering. While Williams characterizes Job as 
eventually “awed to silence, not by divine love, but by God’s absolute power,” a 
conclusion that would run contrary to the canonical narrative of suffering, alternative 
interpretations of the book of Job are possible.  It must be noted that Job frequently 132
occupies itself with difficult questions and protest. The book of Job is somewhat akin to a 
Socratic dialogue, within which Job is confronted by strife and forced to contemplate its 
source. Throughout, Job attempts to find answers as he ponders options offered by those 
close to him and even directly from God. Clearly, Job is blameless for his torment (Job 
1:1, 8). Job’s final submission in the knowledge of God’s absolute power is a somewhat 
unsatisfactory one. Though Job repents “in dust and ashes,” the reader is left to question 
why this must be so (42:6). If Job is blameless, is he wrong in merely daring to question 
the state of his punishment?  
 Soelle characterizes Job in an interesting fashion. Soelle compares the book of 
Job to a folktale, in which mortal humans are tested by a trickster god.  The difference 133
between Job and the typical mortal protagonist is that Job has no hope of conquering his 
various obstacles—Job’s trials are not made up of feats of heroism, but endurance 
 Williams suggests that the prophets were prevented from explicitly identifying God’s 131
suffering due to reverence for the holy. The writers were likely hesitant to make such claims 
about the divine, so there may be layers of intent to be uncovered if the texts are given proper 
consideration. Williams asserts that the prophets do describe a God that suffers, despite the 
clandestine nature of the depictions (31-33).
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tests.  Soelle rightly points to the stark difference between the tyrant-God of Job and the 134
lamenting God of the prophets.  The God who suffers in the alienation of humanity 135
cannot be the same God who rebukes the faithful for questioning the purpose of their 
affliction.  
 Soelle’s solution to this contradiction is found within Job 19:25, in the form of a 
disputed phrase: “For I know that my Redeemer lives, and that at the last he will stand 
upon the earth.”  Soelle equates the phrase translated as “Redeemer” within the NRSV 136
with “advocate” or “blood-avenger,” arguing that the figure Job appeals to within this 
verse is not the God who has inflicted him with such suffering.  Though Soelle goes on 137
to insist that Job’s answer to this unearned suffering is an atheistic cry that will be later 
answered in Christ,  I disagree with this conclusion. 138
 As previously noted, Job’s questioning takes the form of a Socratic dialogue, 
offering multiple potential causes of Job’s suffering. The musings of Job and the various 
voices he consults may be reflective of the dialogue occurring within the author’s own 
community. In the face of human suffering, Job is a series of answers that encourage 
dialogue. There is a reason why Job is such a perplexing text: for all of the questions that 
the book of Job raises, it answers very few of them. The most important conclusion for 
this thesis is that the authors of the Hebrew Bible were actively contemplating the role of 
 Ibid. 134
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suffering in their lives, an engagement the book of Job clearly demonstrates. Further, this 
contemplation did not exclude God. Amidst its various depictions of God’s character, the 
Hebrew Bible offers a God that suffers as humanity does. These writings provide the 
bedrock for later reinterpretations of suffering in light of the cross.  
Cross 
 The meaning and purpose of suffering is demonstrated through what Jeff Pool 
calls the “Christian symbol of divine suffering,” or Jesus of Nazareth.  While the many 139
depictions of suffering throughout the Hebrew Bible call into question the purpose of 
suffering, offering varying answers, the incarnation provides what the Christian faith 
identifies as the final word on the matter. In the suffering of Christ, the power of human 
suffering in general is embodied and illustrated. 
 Pool’s argument begins with an appeal to the imago dei shared between God and 
humanity, asserting that the awareness of this likeness was lost among human beings with 
the introduction of sin.  However, full awareness was not lost entirely, as one can 140
observe its presence in a number of writings and human endeavors before it is fully 
illuminated in Christ.  Pool argues that God’s choice of incarnation and death was 141
intended to reawaken the knowledge of the imago dei in humanity, essentially providing 
an example for human beings to follow in the wake of the resurrection.  In Pool’s 142
 Pool’s book God’s Wounds: Hermeneutic of the Christian Symbol of Divine Suffering, 139
echoes this phrase in is subtitle. Jeff B. Pool, God’s Wounds: Hermeneutic of the Christian 





words, “through Jesus of Nazareth, God-become-human, God displays to humans their 
authentic creatureliness with God.”  Christ is both a demonstration of the imago dei and 143
of how likeness to God is best illustrated by human persons.  
 Of course, Pool’s characterization of the imago dei challenges the previously 
developed conception of likeness to God that appeals to Moltmann. Pool claims that the 
imago dei is only truly realized after the divine action of incarnation, arriving at post-
resurrection universalism.  If accepted, this view of humanity’s likeness to God 144
conflicts with the comparison Moltmann makes between royal divine inheritance and 
universal divine inheritance. Because Pool claims that human beings did not participate 
in the full imago dei before the resurrection, the unique appeal of universal divine 
inheritance that Moltmann favors is lost. Though Pool’s analysis affirms universal 
salvation, this theory excludes all human beings who lived before Christ from full 
realization of the imago dei.  
 Additionally, there is a clear connection between likeness to God and awareness 
of non-being within the fall narrative, especially when the two creation narratives (within 
Gen. 1 and Gen 2-3) are examined separately. Acknowledgement of sin in the fall does 
not lessen humanity’s realization of the imago dei, as Pool suggests, but increases it by 
allowing humanity greater awareness of non-being. It is only in light of this connection 
that one can go on to assert that Christ is the fully realized embodiment of the imago dei




that divine suffering is disclosed in Jesus of Nazareth, further emphasizing the 
importance of the knowledge of non-being as an aspect of the imago dei.  Surely, if 145
God chooses to experience affliction and the threat of non-being—actual death—through 
Christ, the same phenomena cannot prevent humanity from fully realizing likeness to 
God. Rather, likeness to God is an inherent quality in all human beings, the purpose of 
which is demonstrated in Christ. 
 The imago dei not only results in the awareness of suffering, but in the divine 
capability to conquer suffering through relationship. In sharing God’s likeness, the God 
who suffers, dies, and continues to live shares this ability with human beings. The 
crucifixion is a demonstration of the possibility of the conquering of human suffering, 
insofar as it is the choice of God to claim non-being and change as a result of this claim. 
In light of the cross, humanity is shown what is possible and the question of suffering is 
answered: in suffering, one gains the ability to conquer suffering in community. Fiddes 
summarizes this conception of the cross as such: “by responding to the self-giving love 
displayed in God’s encounter with death, we are enabled to co-operate with God in new 
possibilities for life which he eternally offers to human personalities, in this life and the 
life to come. So God wins our response to him, the response that nullifies non-being 
where our lack of response had given it power over us.”  Though God is to be 146
understood as having suffered before the incarnation, God’s suffering reaches its full 
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meaning, becoming its “most creative and persuasive,” in Christ, generating a new 
understanding of suffering in its wake.   147
 The reality of Christ’s suffering must be taken seriously. Soelle criticizes the 
tendency of theologians throughout history to neuter the agony of Christ, both as depicted 
in Gethsemane and on the cross.  Jesus’ expressions of affliction are clear within the 148
biblical text. In Matthew, Jesus suffers from alienation from his companions, finding 
himself awake and alone as they sleep, despite his pleas for them to stay awake with him 
(26:36-46).  As Soelle argues, this command to remain awake and vigilant with Christ 149
is not only directed at the disciples, but is a directive for all followers of Christ.  150
Further, the suffering of Christ cannot be considered to be unrepeatable—the suffering 
and death alone that was experienced by Jesus is “appropriated” by all who experience 
pain, affliction, and impending death.  The gritty reality of the crucifixion that is 151
depicted within the gospels is surely a testament to this fact. This is a reality 
acknowledged by both the gospel authors and the characters within the crucifixion 
narrative. The mocking tone of Mark’s chief priests and scribes as they remark, “He 
saved others; he cannot save himself. Let the Messiah, the King of Israel, come down 
from the cross now, so that we may see and believe,” is demonstrative of the incredibly 
human quality of Christ’s death (15:31-32). The death of Christ not only demonstrates the 
 Ibid.147
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ability of humanity to take up powerful suffering, but also reassures the sufferer that God 
understands. God does not identify with the oppressed arbitrarily, but does so from a 
place of experience.   
Revelation 
 If the death and resurrection of Christ is to be understood as the climax of the 
biblical narrative, Revelation is to be understood as its grand conclusion. The book of 
Revelation offers humanity a fantastical imagining of the eschaton, a glimpse at the 
culmination of God’s work in creation. Though I do not wish to claim that Revelation is 
made up of foretold premonitions, as this is certainly not the case, it does present an 
illustration of what the “goal” of being may be. Revelation serves as the summary 
statement for the broad biblical question: “Why do we and how ought we suffer?” 
 Kitamori directly references Revelation in his discussion of suffering as God’s 
essence.  The reason why Kitamori utilizes the text in support of his conclusion is 152
obvious; Revelation frequently highlights a theme of suffering as ultimate divine power, 
placing suffering and death at the forefront of the battle between good and evil. Kitamori 
quotes the following from Revelation 1:17-18, “I am the first and the last, and the living 
one. I was dead, and see, I am alive forever and ever.”  This characterization of God is 153
repeated in 2:8.   154
 Kitamori, 45. 152
 Kitamori’s translation reads “I died, and behold I am alive for evermore,” while the 153
NRSV reads as quoted (45).
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 Revelation repeatedly points to the paradox of God’s power in suffering, naming 
Christ “the Lamb that was slaughtered” (5:12). While the biblical author expresses the 
expectation that the “Lion of the tribe of Judah” will conquer and open the scroll of the 
seven seals, a Lamb that has been slaughtered appears instead, subverting the 
expectations of onlookers and the author (5:5-11). The characters within the narrative 
continue to point to this subversion of expectations, drawing attention to it. They sing, 
“You are worthy to take the scroll and to open its seals, for you were slaughtered and by 
your blood you ransomed for God saints from every tribe and language and people and 
nation” (5:9). “Many angels” continue, “Worthy is the Lamb that was slaughtered to 
receive power and wealth and wisdom and might and honor and glory and 
blessing!” (5:12). Revelation clearly links the death of Christ with glory and victory in 
the eschaton, affirming and emphasizing the overarching narrative of the biblical text. 
The slaughtered Lamb of the narrative’s climax returns in full power, having taken up and 
conquered suffering, so that God will be glorified and helpless suffering can be 
conquered for all. In God’s suffering, humanity may fully claim its own suffering. Rather 
than seeking ascetic acceptance of pain that is blind to its reality, “they did not cling to 
life even in the face of death,” embracing suffering in its ability to empower justice 
(12:11).  
 Though a literal interpretation of these verses may be appealing, leading to an 
affirmation of what Soelle criticizes as Christian masochism or martyrdom, it is clear that 
death for death’s sake is not what is intended. Written within the context of a depiction of 
the Lamb as “slaughtered,” the tale of the faithful who happily accept their deaths at the 
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hands of beast cannot be considered as mass suicide (13). Rather, the acceptance of death 
that is described within Revelation is a powerful taking up of suffering and persecution, a 
march toward non-being that strips evil of its power. In embracing the reality of suffering, 
the saints reject the worldly, unilateral structures of power that the beast may offer them 
and accept the relational power of Christ. Christ’s suffering and death are starkly 
contrasted with the obsessive acquisition of power sought by the narrative’s adversarial 
players—the “presentation of seals (and war horses), trumpets (and monster beasts), and 
the Dragon and the Great Harlot.”  The latter endeavor is not successful, ultimately 155
overpowered by the sacrifice of Christ. The resulting moral of the narrative is not that 
Christians ought to go seeking their own destruction, but that they ought to face suffering 
with the dignity required to make it visible. In emerging from our own encounters with 
the beast, we may be enlisted to fight the beasts that others face. Only in utilizing 
suffering to liberate the oppressed may we move toward the final glorification of God. 
Revelation, therefore, is the biblical text’s conclusion and moral directive. 
Synthesis 
 The structure of the biblical narrative is, therefore, as follows: (1) God creates 
humanity in God’s image and sharing in God’s likeness, capable of knowing and 
experiencing suffering by virtue of being in relationship with the other; (2) the history of 
humanity is textured by the question of suffering and this question’s many possible 
answers, the most important of which is the acknowledgement of a God who hears the 
cries of sufferers and works to liberate them; (3) the purpose of suffering is demonstrated 
 Robert W. Canoy, Atonement in the Apocalypse: An Exposé of the Defeat of Evil (Macon: 155
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in the life, suffering, and death of Jesus Christ, which also allows God to conquer non-
being via God’s inter-relational nature; and (4) the glorification of God and the final 
destruction of helpless suffering is realized in the eschaton via the suffering and 
resurrection of Christ and all who follow him. This summation of the biblical narrative is 
certainly not exhaustive or fully comprehensive, but it does offer a skeletal structure of 
the text within which other pieces of scripture may be interpreted. This narrative structure 
affirms and is affirmed by the theological position of “process-oriented passibilism” 
described earlier. The claims that make up this approach, namely that God suffers 
powerfully and wishes for humanity to access the same powerful suffering, are found to 
be sufficiently supported by the biblical text.  
Chapter 3: Forming a Hermeneutic of Powerful Suffering 
 How, then, ought biblical texts be approached if the interpreter is employing a 
process-oriented passibilist perspective? If the biblical narrative is a story of suffering, 
how ought we examine the texts that do not appear to directly fit within the narrative’s 
progression? The following hermeneutical guidelines are intended to provide parameters 
for interpreting the biblical text through the lens of powerful suffering. This strategy is 
informed by a variety of other approaches to hermeneutics and interpretive tools. 
Henceforth, this strategy will be referred to as the “hermeneutics of powerful suffering.” 
Warrant and Methodology 
 The hermeneutics of powerful suffering are patterned after two key approaches to 
biblical interpretation: thematic approaches and various hermeneutics of suspicion. The 
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strategy to be formed within this section draws upon key aspects from each category due 
to its methodological similarity.  
 First, a hermeneutic of powerful suffering resembles other thematic interpretive 
strategies due to its emphasis on a central biblical theme around which all texts are to be 
centered. This central theme provides the basis for interpretation. From this starting point, 
interpreted texts can be categorized as either consistent or inconsistent with the theme. 
Various causes of a text’s dissonance may then be explored. These causes may be, upon 
examination, identified as inauthenticity, cultural biases, or intentional obscurity. 
Alternatively, the interpreter may be free to accept inconsistent texts as outliers that exist 
within a larger, mostly consistent work, accepting their existence, but choosing to give 
preferential weight to texts that are consistent with the interpretive framework. Outlier 
texts exist for every interpretive method.  
 Augustine employs a thematic interpretive strategy. Augustine places an 
interpretive emphasis on love, asserting that one who does not gather from the text the 
love of God and neighbor has not understood the text at all.  According to Augustine, if 156
an interpreter does not or cannot interpret a specific biblical passage within the 
framework of his conception of love for God and neighbor, the interpreter has failed to 
understand scripture in some way.  The “true” meaning of scripture has not yet been 157
uncovered by the interpreter. Thus, it is the interpreter’s job to uncover this meaning and 




fully grasp it. Those passages which appear to contradict the theme of love when 
interpreted literally must be intended, according to Augustine, to be read allegorically.  
 Walter Brueggemann employs an interpretive strategy that emphasizes the theme 
of the “land” and “landedness.”  Brueggemann’s approach closely mirrors that of this 158
thesis, differing largely in the content of the chosen theme but remaining 
methodologically similar. Brueggemann describes the difference between his approach 
and an existentialist approach as follows:  
Our study of land suggests that [an existentialist] approach is a misunderstanding of 
biblical categories. The central problem is not emancipation but rootage, not meaning 
but belonging, not separation from community but location within it, not isolation 
from others but placement deliberately between the generations of promise and 
fulfillment. The Bible is addressed to the central human problem of homelessness 
(anomie), and seeks to respond to that agenda in terms of grasp and gift.   159
 This approach to interpretation and theology attempts to adhere to what 
Brueggemann identifies as the central categories within the biblical text. A hermeneutic 
of powerful suffering approaches the biblical text in a similar way, identifying key 
categories within the theme of suffering that inform the method—i.e., moving away from 
unilateral power and toward relational power or affirming the role of God as sufferer 
rather than God as the arbitrator of punishment. Though both approaches appear rather 
circular, they embrace their circularity, emphasizing the importance of cross-referencing 
between the biblical text and claims from natural theology.  
 Walter Brueggemann, The Land: Place as Gift, Promise, and Challenge in Biblical Faith 158
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 Brueggemann also differentiates his approach from that of Gerhard von Rad.  160
Von Rad coined the phrase “salvation history,” approaching biblical interpretation via the 
events of God’s action in time.  This approach places a greater emphasis on history than 161
place, reinforcing a dichotomy between space and time that Brueggemann criticizes.  162
Regardless, there is a precedent within the history of biblical interpretation and biblical 
theology for an interpretive approach that relies upon a theme or series of thematic 
categories. In Brueggemann’s case, this hermeneutical strategy serves to further inform 
practical conclusions about homelessness, social justice, environmental justice, and other 
aspects of our current reality.  Its purpose is to uncover biblical truths that may have 163
been overshadowed by previous hierarchal preferences in theology and interpretation, 
such as space/time or individualism. This aim is also true of the hermeneutics of powerful 
suffering, as its goal is to assist interpreters in revealing aspects of the biblical text that 
may have been obscured by a false preference of unilateral power over relational power. 
 The second category of influence is that of suspicion. A hermeneutic of powerful 
suffering may be categorized as a hermeneutic of suspicion in that it seeks to criticize 
previous interpretive endeavors that it perceives to have led to greater marginalization or 
oppression of a specific group.  Though a hermeneutic of powerful suffering identifies 164
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with a wider group of people than that of feminist, liberation, or queer hermeneutics, its 
primary aim is to salvage those aspects of the text that allow the previously oppressed to 
find liberation. Traditional modes of interpretation that emphasize depictions of God’s 
perceived unilateral, coercive power have contributed to the further oppression of those 
who suffer unjustly, many of whom also exist in groups that can identify with other 
hermeneutics of suspicion. By instead emphasizing relational power and its importance 
within the biblical text’s overarching narrative, a hermeneutic of powerful suffering seeks 
to empower the sufferer and advocate for social justice. Interpretations of suffering within 
the biblical text as “weak” or “pitiable” are to be critiqued as products of a framework 
that values unilateral power, while interpretations of suffering as a powerful, intrinsic 
element of loving relationship are to be affirmed and restored to their place at the center 
of the biblical story. Because of this, a hermeneutic of powerful suffering may work 
alongside other hermeneutics of suspicion to offer liberation for marginalized groups. 
Such an approach also hopes to further enhance the work of feminist criticism, within 
which the suffering Christ’s traditional association with submission has been an 
interpretive obstacle.  
 Finally, and for fairly obvious reasons, a hermeneutic of powerful suffering 
deeply identifies with literary criticism. Because the hermeneutic begins with the 
assertion that the biblical text features an overarching narrative of suffering, it is 
necessarily concerned with the way in which various texts fit into the narrative and serve 
its purposes.  As such, a hermeneutic of powerful suffering will seek to analyze both the 165
 Ibid, 14, 143. 165
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literary context of specific passages and their featured characters, internal plots, and 
narrative perspectives. While not every biblical text can be understood as a literal 
narrative, within the framework of this hermeneutic all biblical texts are analyzed as a 
part of the larger, canonical narrative. The biblical text is analyzed in its final form both 
as a series of individual passages and as a canon. The interpreter is therefore concerned 
with what an individual text says on its own and what purpose the text serves in its 
canonical context, as part of the overarching narrative.  
 All of these strategies—emphasis on a theme or series of categories, suspicion, 
and literary critique—inform the basis of a hermeneutic of powerful suffering. This 
strategy mirrors that of previous interpreters and biblical scholars, drawing upon their 
methodological insights for greater clarity in its formation. The proposed guidelines and 
claims for a hermeneutic of powerful suffering are as follows: (1) texts are to be analyzed 
as part of a canonical narrative of powerful suffering; (2) texts are to be understood as 
both theological and anthropological, with God and humanity sharing the role of 
narrative protagonist; (3) texts that depict God’s suffering or desire for relationship with 
humanity are to be considered intentional; (4) interactions between God and humanity are 
to be considered intentional; (5) the text ought to be read from the perspective of the 
sufferer; (6) depictions of power must first be considered through the lens of relational 
power. 
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Expansion of Guidelines 
(1) Texts are to be analyzed as part of the canonical narrative of powerful suffering. 
 The biblical narrative outlined in the previous chapter serves as the basis of this 
hermeneutic. Other texts may contradict the overarching narrative, contribute to it, or be 
deemed irrelevant to it. For example, certain laws or lineages within the Old Testament 
may not contribute to the overarching narrative and may be better examined via an 
alternative strategy. The existence of an overarching narrative does not guarantee that 
every text will fit perfectly within the set parameters. However, there are texts that may 
have been previously deemed irrelevant or contradictory that find new poignancy within 
the established narrative of suffering. The interpreter ought to examine the context of the 
passage within the larger narrative, any intertextually recurring elements within the 
passage, and any instances in which the passage directly references suffering or change 
indicative of suffering (characters being acted upon). Additionally, characters or figures 
within the text that inflict suffering upon others ought to be given sufficient attention, as 
their role may influence the way in which the text influences the larger narrative. 
Historical context is also important to this guideline, as the context in which the text was 
crafted, copied, and redacted may contribute to its interpretation within the narrative. For 
example, could the text have been historically influenced by an earlier text, or are 
connections between the two reliant upon the text as it stands canonically? 
(2) Texts are to be understood as both theological and anthropological. 
 Classically, the biblical text has been considered primarily theological, or a text 
specifically about God. A purely theocentric reading can lead to the neglect of 
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anthropological features in the text, interpreting human agency as the mere illusion of 
power that serves a theocentric purpose.  A process-oriented perspective must reject this 166
tendency of biblical hermeneutics to read God as the sole protagonist of the biblical text. 
Rather, the biblical text is to be understood as a record of the relationship between God 
and humanity, with both parties acting as the narrative’s protagonists. When the role of 
humanity is undermined in biblical interpretation, the only conclusions to be drawn are 
purely theological, relating only to the character and actions of God. If the only answers 
one can gather from the biblical text are those regarding God’s suffering and role in 
suffering, humanity is left with little to actually do. However, if the biblical text is 
interpreted as a treatise concerning both God and humanity, readers are offered 
demonstrations of right action and thinking. The biblical text has much to say about God, 
but it also has a great deal to say about humanity. The protagonist of the human being 
cannot be neglected within a hermeneutic of powerful suffering. This approach takes 
seriously the notion, derived from process theology, that human beings are capable of 
influencing good around them, literally acting as God’s hands in the world. Therefore, 
interpreters ought to pay attention to when human beings act, how they act, and how they 
collaborate with God to influence change, especially via powerful suffering. 
 This argument is utilized by Jeff Pool, who argues that some understandings of the imago 166
dei within scripture have been obscured by anthropocentrism. Pool instead opts to move toward 
“radical theocentricity” in his understanding of humanity and scripture.
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(3) Texts that depict God’s suffering or desire for humanity are to be considered 
intentional. 
 The problem within biblical interpretation of characterizing biblical depictions of 
God’s suffering as purely allegorical or anthropomorphic has already been explained in 
the previous chapter. Therefore, a hermeneutic of powerful suffering draws upon the 
theological claims of a process-oriented passibilist perspective in taking literally biblical 
depictions of God’s suffering and desire. This is the case for both Christ as the 
incarnation and various instances in which God appears, speaks, or is described. This 
hermeneutic avoids the problem of God’s suffering by embracing it at the onset of the 
interpretive endeavor. If the depiction of God’s suffering at hand cannot be reasonably 
accepted for whatever reason (if God’s suffering is depicted as coercive action, for 
example), alternate interpretations may then be explored. However, the first and most 
preferable interpretation of God’s suffering and all expressions of it must be considered 
literal. 
(4) Interactions between God and humanity are to be considered intentional. 
 Just as humanity is to be considered a second protagonist within the biblical text, 
interactions between God and humanity are to be taken seriously. Rather than interpreting 
the actions of humanity on the behalf of God as a front or vehicle for God’s coercive 
power, these interactions are to be initially interpreted as intentional on the part of God. 
For example, the utilization by God of Moses in the liberation of the Israelites may be 
deemed within a coercive power perspective as unnecessary, as God must be capable of 
liberating the Israelites without Moses’ assistance if God is coercively omnipotent. 
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However, a hermeneutic of powerful suffering will reject this interpretation and prefer a 
more literal interpretation of the Exodus narrative—that Moses was key in the liberation 
of the Israelites and served both as God’s liaison to Pharaoh and as a powerful partner in 
the bringing of plagues and the parting of the sea. This interpretation avoids the 
complications of forcing the text to conform to a view of God as coercively omnipotent 
due to a commitment to viewing the interactions between God and human beings as 
purposeful. This guideline also serves to further emphasize the importance of viewing 
God’s relationship with humanity as a meaningful relationship that involves suffering 
love, altering both God and humanity over time. 
(5) The text ought to be read from the perspective of the sufferer. 
 Within texts that feature multiple characters or perspectives, preference ought to 
be initially given to that of the sufferer. The “sufferer” is specifically distinguished from 
any being that causes suffering. The interpretation ought to empathize with the plight of 
the sufferer. Depending upon the agency of the characters involved, the sufferer may be 
deemed as empowered by suffering (if one has taken it up and conquered it) or as 
oppressed by suffering (if one has been caused to suffer helplessly). Beings depicted as 
possessing unilateral power and using it to cause undue suffering will almost always be 
considered antagonistic toward the “sufferer”—in some cases, this may mean that God 
will play the role of antagonist. The interpreter should not avoid texts that depict God as 
an antagonist within this framework. As is the case with Soelle’s reading of Job, this can 
sometimes illuminate an alternate interpretation. This orientation of perspective is not 
always obvious. Sometimes, as could be considered the case in Judges 19-21, the 
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“sufferer” does not speak and is objectified within the text. Searching for these hidden 
sufferers is an important task for a hermeneutic of powerful suffering. In other cases, 
every agent within the narrative may be considered to be a “sufferer.” Regardless, an 
interpretation that allies itself with the sufferer’s perspective is preferred over an 
interpretation that identifies with those who inflict suffering upon the helpless. 
(6) Depictions of power must first be considered through the lens of relational 
power. 
 Obviously, there are instances within the biblical text in which the reader is 
intended to identify with unilateral power in a positive way. This is the case in any 
instance within the Old Testament in which God extolls punishment or is said to directly 
cause destruction, death, or other pains. These depictions are not to be forced to fit within 
the narrative of powerful suffering if they are incompatible. However, wherever possible, 
depictions of both divine and human power are to be first considered as relational power. 
This is the case through a great deal of the prophets, in which God “gives up” Israel to 
outside forces, but must not necessarily be thought of as the direct agent of destruction. 
Similarly, the utilization of Cyrus the Persian in the liberation of the Israelites can be 
understood as God employing persuasive, relational power over unilateral power in an act 
of liberation. Any instance in which power is depicted as positive ought to be given this 
consideration. If this reorientation is not possible, the interpreter ought to refer back to 
the previous guideline and seek the perspective of the sufferer. In some cases, 
reconciliation will be difficult and alternative strategies may be employed. It is up to the 
interpreter to decide how to treat entirely contrary texts. However, it is unlikely that 
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nothing can be illuminated by a hermeneutic of powerful suffering. At the very least, a 
passage may be criticized for its lack of cohesiveness within the larger narrative and its 
preference for those who inflict suffering or prefer non-being. Recognition of the human 
authorship and the historical context of the text allow for such discrepancies and 
disagreements to exist alongside overarching narrative. A hermeneutic of powerful 
suffering will open new doors of interpretation, allowing texts that appear oppressive to 
offer new hope to those who suffer. 
Chapter 4: Interpreting the Song of Songs as a Test Case 
Selection of the Text 
 The Song of Songs, otherwise known as the Song of Solomon or Canticles, is an 
anomaly in biblical interpretation. Its presence within the canon has puzzled and 
confounded scholars for centuries, warranting countless examinations of its potential 
interpretation and use. David Carr writes that one of his students once referred to the 
Song of Songs as the bizarre, sensual red dress of the biblical text.  When thought of in 167
purely allegorical terms, its blatantly sexual innuendo poses more problems than it solves 
for those who wish to purify the book of its scandalous imagery. When examined as a text 
that lacks direct theological significance, the mystery of the book’s canonization is left 
unsolved. In the history of interpretation of the Song of Songs, each scholarly 
contribution appears more like a scream, lost among hundreds of other shouts, than a 
development.  
 David McLain Carr, The Erotic Word: Sexuality, Spirituality, and the Bible (New York: 167
Oxford University Press, 2003), 145.
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 This is the context within which any approach to interpreting the Song of Songs 
must proceed. While providing a comprehensive reading of the book that solves all of the 
various mysteries and disagreements that surround it is impossible, the addition of a 
reading that utilizes a hermeneutic of powerful suffering will offer a method of joining 
conflicting theories and illuminating elements that have not yet been highlighted. In 
testing the hermeneutic that was developed within the previous chapter, a biblical book 
that has taxed the imaginations of scholars throughout the history of biblical 
interpretation seems to be a fitting test case.  
 The Song of Songs also features a series of bizarre characteristics that make it an 
excellent test of the ability of a new hermeneutic. The Song contains no explicit reference 
to God or any divine being, contains an array of terms that are not utilized in any other 
part of the Hebrew Bible, and features shockingly affirmative depictions of human 
sexuality that are not directly mirrored in any other biblical text. How, then, could a book 
like the Song of Songs fit within the biblical meta-narrative of suffering? If the approach 
I have developed is sufficient in both appropriately understanding the Song of Songs 
within the context of the biblical meta-narrative of suffering and is capable of adding 
additional insight to the enterprise of interpreting the Song of Songs, it will be proven a 
useful strategy. 
Previous Scholarship 
 The authorship of the Song is disputed, and the stance of popular scholarship on 
this issue has fluctuated over time. The text characterizes itself as Solomonic in origin, 
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regardless of its historical authorship.  Even if the Song of Songs was not authored by 168
Solomon himself, dating within the reign of Solomon is based on a number of textual 
clues, including the frequent reference to material wealth and luxury, a deep knowledge 
of Egyptian poetic form, and a generally pan-Israelite setting.  However, efforts to 169
accurately date the Song of Songs are as broadly sweeping as efforts to interpret it. Other 
scholars trace the Song’s origins to popular entertainment, describing it as a drinking 
song or form of erotic poetry.  The authorship and dating of the Song is not as important 170
to a hermeneutic of powerful suffering as its place within the canon. It is sufficient to 
accept that the Song itself intends to be understood as Solomonic in origin and bears 
resemblances to Egyptian love poetry. 
 The truly puzzling history of the Song is to be found within the saga of its 
canonization. How could a bizarre, explicitly sexual poem find its way into the canon? 
Even more shocking is the tendency of ancient scholars to place the Song of Songs on a 
pedestal of holiness. Famously, the Rabbi Akiba noted the Song as the “holy of holies,” 
noting that “no day outweighed in glory the one in which Israel received the Song of 
Songs.”  The origin of the book’s title also implies its importance, intending to present 171
the book as the “best” of all songs.  There is evidence that the canonization of the book 172
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was disputed, though its final inclusion within the canon is indisputable and important to 
remember.  The anomaly of the book’s inclusion has since become the primary goal of 173
interpretation. John T. Bunn characterizes the history of the book’s interpretation as a 
“series of attempts to justify its presence in the canon.”  The book’s usage in Jewish 174
praxis may be of assistance in illuminating its canonization. The Song of Songs is 
significantly tied to Passover rituals, being privately read by adherents in conjunction 
with the holy day.  Does this mean that a reading of the Song must operate exclusively 175
within this ritual use? I do not think that this is the case. After all, even within the context 
of this utilization of the Song, readers are warned against reading the book without proper 
preparation or maturity, surely due to its frequently explicit language.  Theophile J. 176
Meek even argues that the original controversy of the canonization of the Song may have 
been due to its usage as a popular drinking song.   177
 In addition to taking seriously the placement of the Song of Songs within the 
canon and the controversy surrounding that canonization, the relationship of the book 
with surrounding texts is also vital. As previously noted, the Song is placed in relation to 
other festival scrolls and bears similarities in usage. Further, the Song bears striking 
linguistic similarities to other biblical books, such as the garden imagery in Genesis or 
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the marital language utilized throughout the prophets. Duane A. Garrett criticizes any 
reading of the Song that appeals to other biblical texts for interpretation, a critique that a 
hermeneutic of powerful suffering will implicitly reject.  When reading the canon as it 178
exists now, intertextual analysis is both common and entirely acceptable. Unless one 
hopes to glean the precise intention of the biblical author in complete isolation from other 
texts, an endeavor that I would consider both impossible and without practical purpose, 
an intertextual reading of the Song is not problematic. The more important question to 
answer is, “What is the role of the Song of Songs in the canon?” What purpose does it 
serve? One finds a variety of answers to this question within scholarship. 
 First, the Song of Songs has been historically subjected to allegorical readings of 
varying severities. One must be careful not to characterize all allegorical readings of the 
Song as the same—there is a great deal of nuance among these varying interpretive 
strategies. In terms of various binary relationships, the Song has been interpreted as 
allegorical of the love between Yahweh and Israel, Christ and the church, and Solomon 
and the virtue of wisdom.  Allegorical strategies have been employed by Hippolytus of 179
Rome, Origen, Jerome, and Augustine.  Roman Catholic tradition has also found within 180
the Song threads of veneration toward the Virgin Mary, namely in the book’s lengthy 
sequences of admiring metaphors.  The allegorical approach has been criticized heavily 181
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and has largely fallen out of popular usage. Garrett alleges that the Song does not imply 
that an allegorical reading is intended, as the language it utilizes is grounded in realistic 
metaphor rather than fantastical imagery.  Garrett further argues that an allegorical 182
approach risks describing God’s love for creation with the same explicit language utilized 
to describe human sexuality, an implication that he finds to be abhorrent.  In an earlier 183
commentary, Garrett describes this consequence of an allegorical reading of the Song as 
follows: “As Eros is legitimized as an expression of spiritual desire, there is ultimately no 
difference between reading the Bible and reading pornography.”  184
 Of course, not all allegorical interpretations of the Song of Songs are so 
straightforward. Gregory of Nyssa’s allegorical reading of the Song analyzes the text in 
various layers, characterizing it as a poem that borrows mundane language to describe the 
divine.  The text can be about human relationships while simultaneously pointing 185
toward the desire of the soul for the divine.  This reading does not necessarily compare 186
love for God with human sexual desire, but it does utilize the same language to 
communicate the otherwise incommunicable.  More recent examinations of the Song 187
that seek to validate its depiction of human sexuality grant similar grace to allegorical 
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readings.  To entirely reject any allegorical approach as either an ascetic attempt at 188
erasing the affirmation of sexuality within the Song or a dangerous step toward 
sexualizing God, as many modern interpreters have done, is to reject the ability of such a 
text to function in multiple ways. This reading will not reject outright the utilization of an 
allegorical understanding within the larger framework of a hermeneutic of powerful 
suffering, as reading the text in this way may allow it to offer deeper insights. 
 In lieu of an allegorical reading, other methods of categorizing the Song of Songs 
typically rely on the form and genre of the book for guidance. Garrett lists the various 
categories ascribed to the song as dramatic, historical, cultic, funerary, wedding, and love 
song literature.  Garrett favors categorizing the Song as a love song, similar to other 189
love poetry within Ancient Near Eastern cultures and canonized due to its similarity to 
various forms of wisdom literature.  This is likely the best way to categorize the genre 190
of the Song, as it lacks in narrative structure and bears little resemblance to other forms 
of poetry utilized in cultic practices.  However, when the book is deconstructed and its 191
various pieces are examined individually, it may be categorized differently. For example, 
Elizabeth Huwiler characterizes the two passages that will be most closely examined in 
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as narrative “dream sequences” is not uncommon and is shared by Meek.  When 3:1-4 193
and 5:2-7 are not described as dream sequences, they are often instead categorized as 
literal narrative sequences that describe real events.  Describing even these two 194
individual texts as narrative sequences poses interpretive problems. The sequences lack 
cohesion with the texts that precede and follow them. The portions of the Song that 
surround these sequences do not reference the events of them in any way. Further, 
characterizing even these two sequences within the Song as narratives unnecessarily 
complicates the book’s overall genre. Why would sections of erotic love poetry be 
interrupted by small, disconnected stories?  
 It is best to understand every part of the Song of Songs as love poetry, as its 
various voices are most understood when they are not confined to specific “characters” or 
the constraints of plot. Over-emphasizing the “reality” within the Song diminishes its 
ability, as poetry, to speak to multiple situations and circumstances, and risks contributing 
to a reading that arbitrarily seeks narrative consequences. The interpreter must also be 
careful to avoid reading too much poetic metaphor into the text. While Garrett rejects 
allegorical interpretations of the Song and categorizations of 3:1-4 and 5:2-7 as narrative 
sequences, his metaphorical interpretation of 5:2-7 is inappropriate. Garrett’s 
interpretation of 5:2-7 will be further critiqued within the following application of the 
hermeneutic of powerful suffering. 
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 The central problems explored within the history of the interpretation of the Song 
of Songs are generally the Song’s canonization, purpose, and moral or theological 
efficacy. Why has such a text been canonized and how ought it be utilized as a part of the 
canon? Though there are countless scholars who have addressed these issues, few have 
done so satisfactorily. There will likely never be a comprehensive reading of the Song of 
Songs that will solve all of the mysteries that surround it. Much like Revelation, the Song 
of Songs is steeped in lofty, metaphorical language that speaks to both the reality that we 
experience and realities that we have yet to grasp. Perhaps this is the appeal of the Song: 
it reaches toward something that we have yet to fully attain and entices its reader with 
imagery of the beautiful, grand, and utterly desirable. Desire is the central focus of the 
Song of Songs. By again examining the Song through a different lens, that of powerful 
suffering, its central motif of desire can be removed from its place as taboo and unholy, 
allowing a reading that affirms both human and divine relationships. 
Applying the New Hermeneutic 
Overview  
 It must first be noted that some of the guidelines for utilizing a hermeneutic of 
powerful suffering will not be directly applicable when interpreting the Song of Songs. 
For example, explicit depictions of God’s suffering are simply not found within the Song, 
so they cannot contribute to the analysis directly. However, if there is a case to be made 
that God’s suffering is present within alternative, allegorical readings of the Song of 
Songs, the third guideline (texts that depict God’s suffering or desire for humanity are to 
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be considered literal) becomes applicable. This is also the case for the fourth guideline 
(interactions between God and humanity are to be considered intentional).  
 The Song of Songs must first be considered within the canonical meta-narrative of 
powerful suffering, as per the first guidelines. The validity of an intertextual reading of 
the Song of Songs has been confirmed, but this does not yet solidify its place within the 
canon. The importance of the Song lies in its unique motifs, including its explicit 
affirmation of human desire. It is not alone in its lack of divine presence, as Esther also 
lacks explicit mention of God. The Song does stand alone in its positive portrayal of 
human love, devoid of any prohibitions that restrict sexuality. This makes including the 
Song in discussions of sexual expression absolutely vital.   195
 How, then, does the Song fit within the meta-narrative? The Song of Songs is 
situated among the Hebrew Bible’s many texts that attempt to explore the question of 
suffering. Though the Song does not appear to feature much of what Soelle characterizes 
as affliction, it is entirely focused upon the anticipation of suffering in the name of love. 
The Song is primarily a text about desiring. As Fiddes discusses, eros inherently involves 
suffering. The speakers within the Song of Songs continually express their willingness to 
be persecuted in the name of their love (1:1, 3:1-4, 5:2-7, 8:1-3, 8:7), warnings to others 
about the risk of suffering in the name of love (2:7, 3:5, 8:4), and the pain that results 
from their relationship (4:9, 5:8, 6:5). The text repeatedly affirms the mutuality of their 
relationship and desire for one another (2:16, 7:10). The text also affirms the strength of 
their mutual love, describing it as “strong as death, passion fierce as the grave” (8:6). It is 
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clear that the Song of Songs fits within the meta-narrative of powerful suffering by 
affirming suffering love. It would be challenging to interpret the Song as holding 
unilateral power over relational power, as its most central motif is mutual desire. Without 
reading the Song allegorically, it depicts human desire, often in the form of sexual desire, 
as good. Within the context of wisdom literature, it offers its own answer to the question 
of suffering: if one must suffer to love, one will embrace the prospect of suffering. While 
the Song does not necessarily feature elements of social justice, it is consistent with the 
claim that desire for relationship and relational power, the ability to be acted upon or to 
change in relationship, is preferable over indifferent, coercive power. 
 In order to read the Song of Songs as both theological and anthropological, 
Garrett’s assertion that describing God in erotic terms is akin to pornography must be 
challenged. Though Garrett’s analysis of the Song seeks to affirm the goodness of human 
sexuality with the text, Garrett arbitrarily encases “good” sexuality within the context of 
legal marriage, harkening back to a view that characterizes human sexuality as inherently 
corrupt.  This compartmentalization of “good” sexuality versus “bad” sexuality 196
contradicts Garrett’s initial claim that sexuality is affirmed as good within the creation. If 
sexuality is inherently good, it does not require conditions in order to be so. What Garrett 
approaches, but ultimately rejects, is the claim that eros is, in itself, a divine virtue. For 
Garrett, erotic desire requires marital boundaries to become good, rather than inherently 
being so. The text itself contradicts this view, as it never explicitly marks the sexuality 
that it depicts as occurring within the confines of marriage, nor does it shy from blurring 
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the categories of binary sex.  Any reading that would confine the depictions of sexuality 197
within the text in this way are extra-biblical are not evident within the text itself.  
 Additionally, the Song never depicts the fulfillment of any sexual acts, only going 
so far as the speakers describing their yearning for one another.  Even as a text about 198
human sexuality, the Song is hardly pornographic, unless, of course, the interpreter draws 
this conclusion from the text implicitly. This is the case with Garrett’s reading of 5:2-7, 
which he characterizes as a metaphor for a woman’s feelings of rejection and pain at the 
conclusion of intercourse.  The text hardly warrants a reading of this kind, which relies 199
so heavily on innuendo that it borders on being ridiculous. It is surely not the Song of 
Songs itself that causes Garrett’s belief that an allegorical reading is blasphemously 
pornographic. 
 The source of the problem that Garrett points toward in an allegorical reading is 
the denial of the goodness of erotic desire. A hermeneutic of powerful suffering not only 
affirms the role of erotic desire in the relationship between God and humanity, but relies 
upon it. It is God’s desire that necessitates God’s passibility and, therefore, God’s love. 
Within this framework, a theological reading of the text is made possible and helpful. As 
Carr argues, the poetic form of the Song makes its various metaphors and language easily 
reapplied.  The Song embraces the risk of desire—the risk that we face as we allow 200
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others to act upon us in relationship.  This risk is mirrored in our relationship to God 201
and God’s relationship to us, as both parties risk themselves in desiring and seeking 
relationship.  Driven by the second guideline of a hermeneutic of powerful suffering, 202
the nuanced allegorical approach of Gregory of Nyssa can be appropriated. Though this 
reading emphasizes human desire more than other allegorical readings tend to, it also 
recognizes the important connection between our desire for one another and God’s desire 
for us.  
 Choosing a more precise pericope within the Song of Songs for analysis will be 
helpful in testing the hermeneutic of powerful suffering. The two complimentary 
sequences within 3:1-4 and 5:2-7 make up the only portions of the Song of Songs in 
which the text describes an instance of violence. Though 3:1-4 does not contain the 
violent incident that is found in 5:2-7, the two portions of the text are best analyzed as a 
pair. Because 5:2-7 describes an episode of violence, in which the vocalist recounts being 
beaten by guards, analyzing this passage and its pair will assist in understanding the book 
as a whole as it is illuminated by a hermeneutic of powerful suffering. What follows is a 
close analysis of Song of Songs 3:1-4 and 5:2-7. 
Text Analysis 
The first sequence (3:1-4). 
 The sequence begins with the female speaker setting the scene. The phrase “upon 




Though the speaker seeks the subject of her love, she does not find him. In the following 
verse, the speaker rises and wanders the city, seeking her lover, but she, again, does not 
find him (v. 2). She passes wandering guards whom she asks about her lover’s 
whereabouts (v. 3). Soon after, she finds her lover, holds him without letting go, and 
brings him to her “mother’s house, and into the chamber of her that conceived me” (v. 4). 
Finally, the sequence ends with the adjuration refrain, “I adjure you, O daughters of 
Jerusalem, by the gazelles or the wild does: do not stir up or awaken love until it is 
ready!” (v. 5).  
 Though the categorization of this passage as a narrative is not problematic when 
the passage is isolated, it does not serve a directly narrative purpose within the wider 
context of the Song. Additionally, its fluctuating setting and strange sense of time do not 
establish it as a comprehensive story. The speaker appears to seek her lover in her 
dreams, rises from her sleep, and then seeks him in the streets. After he is found, she does 
not take him back to the place where she was sleeping before, but to her mother’s home. 
The sequence of events does not work well outside of poetic metaphor. Rather, the text is 
better understood as an illustration of the speaker’s longing for her lover and willingness 
to seek him out. The risk of this seeking is only fully understood within the context of the 
later, similar sequence in 5:2-7. In this first sequence the city is friendly to the speaker 
and does not harm her.  
 The text is relatively easy to view from the perspective of the “sufferer,” as the 
one who suffers within this text is the speaker. She continually seeks and cannot find her 
lover, causing her distress. This feeling of estrangement can also easily double as a 
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theological allegory for the experience of estrangement between God and humanity. 
Viewing the many layers of meaning that the text offers allows one to place many entities 
into the role of speaker: God yearning for humanity, humanity yearning for God, or 
human beings yearning for other human beings. When the text is viewed theologically, 
with God in the place of the speaker, the sequence perfectly describes the phenomenon of 
God seeking relationship with humanity and facing estrangement. The God who 
possesses absolute unilateral power would not wander the streets seeking the beloved, but 
a God who possesses absolute relational power, powerful suffering, must do so in order to 
be fulfilled.  
 The adjuration refrain that closes this sequence is puzzling. The refrain itself is 
sometimes understood to be a warning against extramarital or premarital sex.  An 203
interpretation of the refrain that is more consistent with the Song’s general approach to 
human sexuality and desire is one that is revealed by a hermeneutic of powerful suffering. 
When one chooses to join in relationship to another, whether the other is God or another 
person, one accepts a certain amount of risk. Perhaps one will be abandoned, hurt, 
rejected, or, more positively, fundamentally changed by the relationship. To enter into 
relationship with another is to risk one’s being, becoming willing to change in response to 
someone else. This risk is what the speaker warns the daughters of Jerusalem of—do not 
awaken love until you are prepared for it! It requires fully taking up the possibility of 
suffering for one to truly love meaningfully. This reading is most consistent with the 
Song’s affirmation of desire and role as a guide for meaningful relationship. 
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The second sequence: 5:2-8. 
 Unlike the first sequence, the beginning of the second sequence does not 
necessarily imply a dream-like state. Rather, the speaker explains, “I slept, but my heart 
was awake” (5:2). While this could imply that she is speaking as if experiencing a dream, 
it is much less clear than the first sequence. The speaker may also be restless, sleeping, 
but waiting for something to happen. She is alerted when her beloved begins knocking, 
calling, “Open to me, my sister, my love, my dove, my perfect one; for my head is wet 
with dew, my locks with the drops of the night” (v. 2). Unlike the first sequence, we are 
now offered a second perspective: that of the lover. He speaks in adoration of his “perfect 
one,” calling for her from outside. A literal interpretation of the lover’s dewy hair is likely 
appropriate, a sign of his devotion and arrival to his beloved’s home before dawn.   204
Though the text could be interpreted as euphemistic here, such a reading is not clearly 
evidenced by any textual clues. The speaker responds to her lover’s calls with a series of 
protests and hesitations, saying, “I had put off my garment; how could I put it on again? I 
had bathed my feet; how could I soil them?” (v. 3). It is clear that the speaker is to be 
understood as prepared for bed, having undressed and washed her feet appropriately.  
 Despite her misgivings, she is persuaded in the following verse by the actions of 
her lover. She says, “My beloved thrust his hand into the opening, and my inmost being 
yearned for him. I arose to open to my beloved, and my hands dripped with myrrh, my 
fingers with liquid myrrh, upon the handles of the bolt” (v. 4-5). Again, though 
interpreting these verses as a euphemistic description of intercourse is tempting, there are 
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no explicit textual clues to point to this reading aside from the reader’s own personal 
interpretation. A literal interpretation is also possible, as door latches of the period were 
sometimes designed to only allow entry if the person inside of the room also grasped the 
handle, freeing the latch.  The usage of “liquid myrrh” could also be interpreted as a 205
literal description of anointed oils, but may also be interpreted as decorative language that 
enhances the reader’s understanding of the speaker’s longing.  
 By the time the speaker opens the door, her beloved is gone (v. 6). Interestingly, 
she notes that her “soul failed me when he spoke,” implying that her failure of resolve to 
open the door for her beloved caused his disappearance. Again, she seeks him but cannot 
find him. In this sequence, the guards that find the speaker in the city are not kind. She 
says, “they beat me, they wounded me, they took away my mantle, those sentinels of the 
walls” (v. 7). Finally, the sequence ends with an alternative adjuration refrain that reads, 
“I adjure you, O daughters of Jerusalem, if you find my beloved, tell him this: I am faint 
with love” (v. 8). This time, the speaker never finds her lover and remains in a state of 
yearning for him.  
 The beating of the speaker at the hands of the guard within this sequence is 
understood by some interpreters as a punishment for her “inability to control her 
emotional involvement” with her lover.  Garrett’s interpretation is similar, but forces the 206
entire sequence into a metaphor for intercourse that leaves the female partner feeling 
rejected, the beating of the guards serving as a symbol for the pain of losing one’s 
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virginity.  As noted above, a reading of this sequence as a series of euphemisms is not 207
indicated by the text itself, requiring some effort on the part of the interpreter to make 
clear connections. There is no textual indication that the sequence ought to be read as a 
general metaphor for the loss of a new wife’s virginity. This interpretation implies that the 
text acts as a warning against pursuing love frivolously or desiring for another without 
restraint, but if this were the case, one would expect the first sequence to also contain 
some act of punishment or violence.  
 The guidelines of a hermeneutic of powerful suffering guide interpretation by 
requiring a shift in perspective. Instead of viewing the guards that beat the speaker as 
arbitrators of some punishment for wrongdoing, we ought to view the text from the 
perspective of the sufferer: the speaker. It is the speaker’s perspective that is most 
important for understanding the text. This allows us to view her beating at the hands of 
the guards not as punishment, but as a risk that she has taken up in pursuing her lover. 
Despite her suffering at the hands of those who would interrupt her pursuit and take her 
from her lover, she continues. The sequence does not end with the speaker learning her 
lesson and controlling herself, but with another affirmation of her yearning love. The 
speaker accepts the risk of suffering and continues on in her desire. The unilateral power 
that the guards utilize to inflict suffering upon the speaker is condemned, while the 
speaker’s relational power, via her desire for her lover, is reaffirmed. 
 Further, the speaker recognizes her shortcomings within her relationship. Though 
her lover called to her, she failed to respond. The established hermeneutic allows us to 
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also shift perspectives to a different sufferer: the speaker’s lover. He is described as 
calling from the door, waiting in the dew, mutually yearning for his beloved. However, 
his calls are not answered. Perhaps they are both at fault for the estrangement that they 
feel as a result of this encounter—the masculine lover turns away too soon, and the 
feminine beloved does not answer soon enough. They both fail to offer themselves fully. 
The desire of both lovers within this sequence, unlike the first sequence, also reinforces 
the importance of mutual desire within the Song. The love between the two figures is not 
hierarchal or exploitative, but is mutual.   208
 When read theologically, the text need not describe God explicitly. This would 
only be the case if the entire sequence were understood solely via innuendo. Rather, the 
speaker or the lover at the door can be understood as God. God waits for humanity’s call 
from within, but initiates relationship to find that we have walked away in our 
impatience, unwilling to risk ourselves. God knocks at the door, but we hesitate and find 
ourselves in a state of estrangement from God, searching and calling in our desperation. 
Though God seeks relationship with humanity and suffers literal death, God yet lives and 
continues to desire us. 
Practical Application 
As a text that speaks about the relationship between human beings, the Song of 
Songs establishes the goodness of human desire, unrestricted by the boundaries of any 
binary or prohibition. It denies the claims of stark asceticism, instead establishing 
mutually desiring love as love that mirrors the divine. The text also offers wisdom for 
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those who seek meaningful and fulfilling relationships, sexual or otherwise: meaningful 
relationships require that one desires connection with another and is willing to risk 
themselves for it. The acceptance of the risk of suffering is a necessary part of entering 
into a relationship. Emerging from suffering with one’s love intact is the ultimate proof of 
lasting love. When this is applied to all human relationships, it becomes clear that the 
taking up of suffering is necessary to love meaningfully. When one flees from suffering, 
ignores it, or otherwise believes that it is to be avoided, one misses a crucial aspect of 
loving relationship. One must endanger their being in relationship to truly experience 
compassionate love, and it is only in this way that one could hope to reach those who are 
suffering alone. 
 The Song need not be understood solely as a text about humanity alone, despite 
the absence of explicit references to God. There is a reason why the Song of Songs has 
been interpreted allegorically by so many theologians and interpreters, and it reaches 
beyond a mere fear of human sexuality. The desire described within the Song is a divine 
desire, recalling a higher love to which we aspire. We yearn for the mutual, meaningful 
connection that the Song sings about. When one reads the Song of Songs, one is turned 
toward the divine. However, an allegorical reading that is not cautious may result in the 
denial of the goodness of desire or the material altogether. These texts are only truly 
revealed theologically if the desire of God for relationship with humanity is affirmed. An 
interpreter need not give up an allegorical reading of the Song of Songs in favor of a 
reading that affirms human desire. Interpreting the Song allegorically is possible when 
one’s understanding of God’s power is shifted to include erotic love for humanity. Within 
!80
a hermeneutic of powerful suffering, an understanding of God’s desire is a fundamental 
theological claim that must be considered seriously. 
 Thus, a hermeneutic of powerful suffering not only establishes the Song of 
Songs’s place within the canonical meta-narrative as a love poem seeking to understand 
desire and suffering in the midst of other explorations of the same issue, but opens the 
door for an interpretation of the Song that allows for the text to speak both theologically 
and anthropologically.  
Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 The theological assertions of Fiddes, Williams, Soelle, Moltmann, Kitamori, and 
others have been synthesized to produce a process-oriented passibilist theology that 
affirms God as the relational sufferer, seeking relationship with humanity. This 
conclusion is found to be supported by the biblical text, within which a meta-narrative of 
powerful suffering can be revealed. The best way to solve the problem of texts that do not 
fit cleanly within this meta-narrative is to form a hermeneutic of powerful suffering that 
utilizes a process-oriented passibilist lens. Finally, this hermeneutic is shown to be useful 
in its application to Song of Songs 3:1-5 and 5:2-8, which grants the Song of Songs a role 
within the meta-narrative of powerful suffering and assists in fostering a better 
understanding of the text as both anthropological and theological. 
 The biblical text opens with the first account of human suffering and closes with 
hope for a future devoid of suffering. Finding ourselves somewhere in the middle of these 
events, we are offered a paradox: take up suffering so that one may eliminate the 
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suffering of others. Midsommar’s Christian stood in his apathy, devoid of empathy for his 
partner like a watching God-king, incapable of understanding her plight. Similarly, it 
sometimes appears as if many in our world today have given up their compassion in favor 
of power. As long as one gains materially or in reputation, the sufferings of fellow human 
beings are inconsequential. I have experienced many crises of conscience within the 
strange context of the American COVID-19 crisis. Amidst the physical suffering endured 
by many, the nation faces political and cultural upheaval in the form of some of the 
largest civil rights protests that the country has ever seen.  As we are isolated in our 209
homes or thrust into a dangerous world, it seems much easier to close ourselves off from 
the risk of relationships. Bonding with our fellows means risking not only our 
understanding of ourselves and the world, but sometimes our physical well-being. 
 Despite these circumstances, sufferers can be seen emerging from their dark 
nights every day. Those who continue to care for the sick, provide essential goods, teach, 
and cry for justice do so in the midst of their own sufferings and in spite of them. Like 
God, we must face non-being, claim it, and work to conquer it for others. It is only 
through love and meaningful relationships, mirroring those of Christ, that we can hope to 
relieve our grief. As a student of theology and biblical interpretation, I have often felt as 
if my contributions to humanity’s sufferings are insignificant. The solution to this feeling 
 Though civil rights protests have been instrumental in the fight for racial equality in the 209
United States for decades, the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests far surpassed known attendance 
records and continue to draw crowds as I am writing this thesis. This is likely due to record high 
unemployment in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic, which allowed many who would have 
been working to attend protests instead. Additionally, growing civic unrest and more widespread 
circulation of incidents of police brutality on social media drew crowds in every state, as well as a 
number of other countries. Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui, and Jugal K Patel, “Black Lives 
Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History,” The New York Times, July 3, 2020.
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of insignificance is to be found in the practice of compassion, even as it is expressed via 
biblical interpretation. Through a hermeneutic of powerful suffering, we must witness the 
wailings of the many sufferers within the biblical text and cry out alongside them. 
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